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Spin-Offs Before and After the Tax Reform Act
DONALD

T

I.

F. BROSNAN*

OVERVIEW

HE passage of the Tax Reform Act of 19861 (the "Act") is an appropriate occasion to explore the federal income tax consequences of
the distribution of the stock of a controlled subsidiary by the controlling
parent to its shareholders, commonly referred to as spin-offs. These consequences are principally governed by section 355 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. The rules of section 355 are particularly complex and
the question arises whether they were or are appropriate either before or
after the passage of the Act.
My method will be first to set out in Part II the problem of capital
gain bailout which motivates the rules of section 355 and is exemplified
by the case of Gregory v. Helvering.2 Gregory is the paradigm bailout case
and can illustrate the problem of bailouts and the statutory solution to
bailouts in section 355. Part III examines the current statutory framework in detail by discussing the major requirements for complying with
section 355. The historical development of tax-free spin-offs from Gregory to the present is outlined in Part IV.
Even in a pre-Act world, in which preventing the conversion of ordinary income into preferred capital gains was an important goal of tax
policy, section 355 is misguided. Part V discusses the problems of section
355 case law, which form the basis of this belief, while Part VI will discuss the conceptual issues underlying section 355 which cause these
problems. Because the historical policy of section 355 is still important,
Part VII will discuss the proposed reforms of section 355 which will accomplish these policy objectives. These reforms include a stock taint or
mandatory stock stapling policy.
Part VIII explores the role spin-offs and related corporate transactions may play after the passage of the Act and the repeal of the General
*

Visiting Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University Law School. I would like to

thank Tom Griffith, Glen Kohl, Joel Rabinowitz, Louis Del Cotto, several members of Irell &
Manella as well as the ABA's Section 355 Working Group for reading earlier drafts. Errors are my
own!
1. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (Codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
2. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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Utilities3 doctrine. This repeal established that any distribution of appreciated property by a corporation to its shareholders should result in a
gain, recognized by the distributing corporation. In light of these transactions, Part IX further proposes either radical simplification or outright
repeal of section 355. The most desirable reform, as originally proposed,
would be a "stapling" requirement imposed on the distributed shares.
II.

GREGORY AND THE BAILOUT

In Gregory v. Helvering, Evelyn F. Gregory, as of January 3, 1928,
owned all 5,000 shares of United Mortgage Corporation ("UMC") which
she had purchased for $350,000. One asset of UMC was 1,000 shares of
Monitor Securities Corporation ("MSC") stock with a value of
$133,333.33 and an undisclosed basis in the hands of UMC. Gregory
wished to sell the MSC shares and personally hold the sales proceeds
with a minimum income tax liability. The straightforward method of
achieving this goal would impose two levels of tax. On the first level, a
capital gains tax would be imposed upon UMC on its sale of the MSC
stock to a third party. A second level of tax, an ordinary income tax on
the distribution of the (net of tax) sales proceeds by UMC, would be
charged to Ms. Gregory.4
The taxpayer used the following provision to achieve her goal at a
cost of only an individual shareholder level capital gains tax:
Sec.112. (g) Distribution of stock in a reorganization. If there is distributed, in pursuance of a plan of reorganization, to a shareholder in a
corporation a party to the reorganization, stock or securities in such corporation or in another corporation a party to the reorganization, without the
surrender by such shareholder of stock or securities in such a corporation,
no gain to the distributee from the receipt of such stock or securities shall
be recognized ....
(i) Definition of a reorganization. As used in this section...
(1) The term "reorganization" means... (B) a transfer by a corporation of
all or a part of its assets to another corporation if immediately after the
transfer the transferor or its stockholders or both are in control of the corporation to which the assets are transferred ....

The steps taken were as follows:
On September 18, 1928, the Averill Corporation was organized under Delaware law. On September 20, 1928, the United Corporation transferred to
3.
4.
5.
6.

General Utilities v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
But see infra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 112(g), 45 Stat. 791, 818 (1928).
Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 112(i), 45 Stat. 791, 818 (1928).
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the Averill Corporation the 1,000 shares of Monitor stock, in consideration
for which the Averill Corporation issued its shares to the petitioner. 7 On
September 24, 1928, the Averill Corporation liquidated and dissolved, thus
distributing its entire assets, consisting of the Monitor shares, to its only
shareholder, the petitioner.
On the same date as the liquidation distribution, petitioner sold the
Monitor shares for $133,333.33. In, her return, she treated these several
transactions as governed by the several reorganization provisions of the
statute, and returned as capital net gain derived from the sale price of

$133,333.33 the amount of $76,007.88 upon an apportioned cost basis of
$57,325.45.8

The accompanying charts illustrate the two procedures for putting
the MSC sales proceeds in Mrs. Gregory's hands. 9 The essence of Mrs.
Gregory's scheme was to liquidate part of her investment in UMC, paying only a personal capital gains tax on the liquidation of Averill in lieu
of a corporate capital gains tax plus an individual dividend tax.10
7. As the charts illustrate, this transaction seems to collapse at two different points: first upon
the issuance of Averill stock to UMC, and secondly, upon the distribution of that stock to Gregory.
8. Gregory v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 223, 224 (1932), rev'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). It is not
clear how Gregory apportioned basis, especially as the reports of the cases do not state the MSC
stock's inside basis in the hands of UMC. The MSC stock apparently comprised $133,333.33/
350,000, or 38%, of the fair market value (fmv) of the UMC assets, assuming relative values were
the same in January and in September of 1928. Yet, Mrs. Gregory apportioned only $57,325.45, or
16%, of her basis in the UMC stock, which became the substituted basis of the Averill stock, to the
receipt from Averill of the MSC stock in the liquidation. Thus it is not clear whether the relative
value of the MSC stock changed, or rather Gregory calculated basis on some other assumption than
proportion of MSC stock fmv to total UMC asset fmv, such as the proportion of MSC inside basis to
total asset inside basis.
9. The transaction in the top portion of the chart is a straightforward sale at the corporate level
plus the distribution of a dividend. There is a corporate capital gains tax imposed on the first transaction and an ordinary income dividend tax imposed on the shareholder on the second.
The eight steps in the bottom portion of the chart illustrate the tax savings created by Mrs.
Gregory's plan. First there is the creation of Averill and the tax-free contribution to capital of the
appreciated MSC stock. Then there is the tax-free distribution, using the reorganization provision, of
the Averill stock to Mrs. Gregory; at that point she is the sole shareholder of both corporations.
Then there is the liquidation of Averill, which puts the appreciated MSC stock in Mrs. Gregory's
hands. There is only a shareholder level capital gains tax at this time. She holds the MSC stock with
a fair market value basis. Finally, there is the sale of the MSC stock. This is taxable; however there is
no gain to recognize as she held the stock immediately before the sale with a fair market value basis.
Comparing the net results of the two transactions, the straightforward approach has a corporate
capital gains tax plus an individual ordinary income tax; the putative spin-off transaction on the
other hand imposes only a shareholder level capital gains tax, for a substantial tax saving.
10. At the time the transaction took place, the only tax avoidance effect was the conversion of
an individual dividend tax on receipt of the MSC stock into an individual capital gains tax. This is
because UMC could have distributed the MSC shares to Mrs. Gregory directly as a dividend without
recognizing any corporate level gain because of the General Utilities rule.
In addition to Mrs. Gregory's proper tax treatment involving the question of simple capital gain
vs. ordinary income/taxable dividend, the proper tax treatment of the transaction in Gregory in-
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The theory used by the IRS to attack this scheme and by the courts
to void it were not the same. In the Board of Tax Appeals, the Commissioner argued that Averill Corporation was without substance and
should be disregarded. This reasoning appropriately failed," and Gregory prevailed at the Board of Tax Appeals. In the Second Circuit, however, Judge Learned Hand used a theory different from that urged by the
Commissioner. He reasoned that a tax reduction is allowed for corporate
reorganizations; however, this was not a legitimate reorganization."2 It
was not so for two reasons: (1) it lacked a business purpose and was a
sham, and (2) the transaction was essentially equivalent to a dividend.
The Supreme Court echoed Hand's reasoning, calling the transaction "a
mere device . . . to transfer a parcel of corporate shares to the petitioner."' 3 During the litigation Congress repealed the tax-free spin-off
provision for a period of some years, as will be described in Part IV
4
below. 1
Gregory is the paradigm bailout case. As explained further below,' 5
there is a more useful and less subjective way to describe the evil of the
bailout than by citing the lack of a business purpose. The Gregory bailout
is best seen as a step transaction. 16 The combined result of the steps Mrs.
Gregory took was the removal of liquid assets from corporate solution
and their placement in her hands by UMC and Averill, followed by their
sale. On this theory, had Averill not been liquidated, the transaction
volves a secondary issue, which remains even after the Tax Reform Act's abolition of the capital
gains preference. If the distribution is to be treated as a dividend, the entire distribution is taxable to
the extent it is out of earnings and profits; if on the other hand the distribution is tax free, that
portion of the distributed stock which represents an amount that is prorated basis from the original
stock of the distributing corporation will not be taxed, even when and if the spun-off stock is eventually sold.
11. A corporation will generally not be ignored as an entity if it is not a purely passive dummy;
however a corporation used for tax avoidance may sometimes be ignored. See D. KAHN & P. GANN,
CORPORATE TAXATION AND TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS 88-119 (2d ed. 1985).

12. Gregory v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 223 (1932), rev'd, Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809
(2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
13. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
14. Of course, when the revenue loss associated with bailout, or the revenue gain associated with
the prevention of bailout, is fully evaluated, consideration of the imponderable factor as to what
extent some transactions may not occur at all, if they cannot be consummated without a current
imposition of tax, is required.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 117-121.
16. The point of classifying the spin-off as a step transaction is to suggest that the tax avoidance
evil is the convergence of two steps: first, the distribution of spun-off stock, and second, realization,
either by liquidation or sale. If this description is correct, later discussion will show that § 355
imposes the penalty (disqualification as a tax-free spin-oft) too early, that is, after the first step alone.
See infra discussion at text accompanying notes 117-121.
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would not have been a bailout, and Mrs. Gregory should have been accorded tax-free reorganization treatment so long as she held her Averill
shares. This position is elaborated by the discussion, in Parts V and VI,
of the latent conceptual problems that underlie a Gregory-type bailout
and which make its proper treatment somewhat obscure.
III. SECTION 355 REQUIREMENTS

The current anti-bailout section operates to prevent schemes like
that of Gregory. There are three major and three minor requirements
which must be met if a shareholder is to receive spun-off stock tax-free;
these requirements are found in section 355 and the regulations thereunder. The major requirements will be examined closely as they are more
difficult to meet and more difficult for courts to test than the minor requirements. The three major requirements are: (1) both the distributing/
controlling corporation and the controlled corporation meet the five-year
active business test; (2) the transaction not be a "device" for the distribution of earnings and profits of either corporation; and (3) there be a valid
business purpose for the transaction. Requirements (2) and (3) stem from
the Gregory decisions.
The minor or more mechanical requirements are: (1) "the distributing corporation" control the spun-off corporation; (2) the distributing
corporation distribute to its shareholders either all of the stock of the
spun-off/controlled corporation or at least an amount of shares constituting "control" of the spun-off corporation; and (3) there be continuity of
interest.
A.

Major Requirements

1. Five-Year Active Business. The five-year active business requirement 7 has several facets. First, there are definitions of the "active
business" in which both corporations must be engaged.II The active business test is met if a corporation carries on "a specific group of activities
• . . for the purpose of earning income or profit [from such group of
activities] . . . . Such group of activities must ordinarily include the
collection of income and the payment of expenses."' 9 Thus, certain passive businesses are excluded from meeting the active component of the
17. See I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(C), (b)(l), (b)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(a),(b) (1989).
18. Technically, the controlling corporation need not be engaged in an active business if immediately before the distribution it held no assets other than stock in controlled corporations actively
engaged in a trade or business. I.R.C. § 355(b)(1)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(a)(1)(i), (b)(l) (1989).
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(b)(2)(ii) (1989).

1990]

SPIN-OFFS

163

test."0 The newly issued regulations contain many examples of businesses
which do and which do not meet the "active conduct of a trade or business" component of this requirement."1 The purpose of this component is
to prevent the spin-off of businesses that may easily be sold after the
distribution. 2 As will be discussed, in relation to the device requirement,
a sale following a distribution makes the transaction resemble a Gregorytype bailout.
The second component of the "active business" test is that the business must have been actually conducted for a period of five calendar
years before the date of distribution. 3 The third component is more frequently troublesome: neither any of the active businesses, nor control of
any corporation conducting the active business, may have been acquired
in a taxable transaction within the above statutory five-year period.'
The policy behind the second and third components was stated in
one decision as follows:
That provision [section 355(b)(2)(C)] [was] enacted to prevent the "bailingout" of. accumulated earnings by the simple expedient of a corporation
purchasing a going business as a temporary investment in anticipation of
the distribution of that business to its shareholders in a tax-free corporate
division under section 355 ....5
2. Not a Device. As the entire purpose of section 355 is to prohibit
a Gregory-type bailout, it is essential that "the transaction was not used
principally as a device for the distribution of the earnings and profits of
the distributing corporation or the controlled corporation or both ....
One important component of this purpose stems from Mrs. Gregory's
20. Limitations. The active conduct of a trade or business does not include: (A) the holding for investment purposes of stock, securities, land, or other property, or (B) the ownership and operation (including leasing) of real or personal property used in a trade or
business, unless the owner performs significant services with respect to the operation and
management of the property.
Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(b)(2)(iv) (1989).
21. See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(c), ex. (l)-(13) (1989).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 113-18.
23. I.R.C. § 355(b)(2)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(b)(3) (1989).
24. I.R.C. § 355(b)(2)(C), (D); Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(b)(4) (1989). As this requirement was
modified by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-2031, 01, this prohibition literally applies only to a "distributee" corporation, which is a drafting error. It is corrected by
§ 2040)(1) of the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat.
3342, 3598-3610 (1988) signed by the President on November 10, 1988. See infra note 207 and
accompanying text.
25. Boettger v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 324, 330 (1968).
26. I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(B); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d) (1989).
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liquidation of Averill and sale of the MSC stock. Such post-distribution
sales of the spun-off stock may arouse suspicion of a bailout.2 7
In addition to a post-distribution sale or liquidation, evidence of a
device may include the possession of liquid assets by either corporation

or certain post-spin-off relationships between the two corporations.28
Note that these points, echoing the point of the preceding quotation,

show a "prophylactic approach." Not only an actual bailout, but also the
setting-up of a potential bailout will be considered evidence of a device.29

3. Business Purpose. The third major requirement is that there
must be a valid, non-tax business purpose for the spin-off.30 Though easily stated, the application of this requirement is a problem because it is
subjective and not clear what types of motivations are and are not valid
business purposes. As stated earlier, this requirement is derived from the
Gregory case, and also from the general requirement that all reorganizations have a business purpose.3 1
B. Minor Requirements

1. Continuity of Interest. The continuity of interest requirement 32
is also derived from general reorganization principles. 33 As a spin-off
contemplates the distribution of the controlled corporation stock to pre-

existing shareholders, this requirement will be satisfied unless the spunoff stock is sold, which would ordinarily implicate the "no device" requirement in any event.
27. Compare I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(B) (non-prearranged sales "shall not be construed to mean that
the transaction was used principally as such a device") with Treas. Reg. 1.355-2(d)(2)(iii) (1989)
(both prearranged and non-prearranged sales to be taken into account in determining whether the
transaction was a device). As the Regulations state:
Section 355 recognizes that a tax-free distribution of the stock of a controlled corporation presents a potential for tax avoidance by facilitating the avoidance of the dividend
provisions of the Code through the subsequent sale or exchange of stock of one corporation and the retention of the stock of another corporation.
Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(1) (1989).
28. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(2)(iv)(B), (C) (1989).
29. This brings up a basic point of policy: should § 355 be prophylactic? See infra discussion at
text accompanying notes 168-77. The cost of penalizing potential bailouts is to prevent tax-free spinoffs where there is no intent to realize earnings and profits by sale of the stock or liquidation of the
spun-off corporation. A better remedy for bailouts would have a closer fit between the penalty and
the bailout attempt.
30. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b) (1989).
31. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b), (c) (1989).
32. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c) (1989).
33. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1989).

1990]

SPIN-OFFS

2. Control In a typical spin-off, the spun-off corporation will be a
wholly owned subsidiary of the distributing corporation, thus meeting
the control definition of section 368(c)(1). Control is established when
the distributing corporation owns at least eighty percent of the aggregate
voting power of voting stock and number of shares of nonvoting stock of
the subsidiary.3 4
3. Distribution. Either all the stock of the spun-off corporation
must be distributed to the distributing corporation's shareholders, or an
amount meeting the section 368(c)(1) definition of control.31 If the distributing corporation retains any stock of the spun-off corporation it
must establish that this was not for a tax avoidance purpose.3 6
Thus we have the three major and three minor requirements for a
tax-free spin-off as derived from section 355, the regulations, and case
law. As we shall see in Part V, which argues that many of the results of
section 355 case law are inappropriate, and Part VI, which describes the
conceptual causes of problems in spin-offs, the problems with section 355
case law are derived from the application of the ambiguous policies underlying the three major requirements.
IV.
A.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 35537

Before Spin-Offs. Pre-1924

In 1919, the first tax-free reorganization provisions were enacted. 38
Spin-offs were not included in the statutory definition, as John D. Rockefeller found to his dismay in 1921 when, to avoid Interstate Commerce
Commission regulation of his oil refineries, he spun them off from his
pipeline business. 39 The taxing of such adjustments in corporate form
seemed unfair to Congress and resulted in the enactment of spin-off legislation in 1924.
The Advent of the Tax-Free Spin-Off Legislation in 1924

B.

In connection with other necessary changes to the reorganization
34.

I.R.C. §§ 355(a)(1)(A), 368(c)(1).

35. I.R.C. § 355(a)(l)(D).
36. I.R.C. § 355(a)(l)(D)(ii).
37. For a more detailed discussion of the historical development of § 355, see Whitman,
Drainingthe Serbonian Bog: A New Approach to Corporate Separations Under the 1954 Code, 81
HARV. L. REV. 1194, 1197-1210 (1968).
38. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1060 (1919).
39. Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U.S. 176 (1921).
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provisions," and considering the unfairness of the Rockefeller 4 case, the
Treasury drafted, and Congress enacted, the first spin-off provision in
1924:
If there is distributed, in pursuance of a plan of reorganization, to a
shareholder in a corporation a party to the reorganization, stock or securities in such corporation or in another corporation a party to the reorganization, without the surrender by such shareholder of stock or securities in
such a corporation, no gain to the distributee from the receipt of such stock
or securities shall be recognized. 42
This section was reenacted in 1928 and 1932. 4 3 In 1932 the Gregory
bailout scheme was held by the Board of Tax Appeals to be permitted by
this language.'
C.

The Moratorium on Spin-Offs: 1934-1951

In the Revenue Act of 1934, enacted shortly after the Second Circuit's reversal4 5 of the Board of Tax Appeals' decision in Gregory, the
spin-off section was omitted from the otherwise reenacted reorganization
sections, based upon opposition to the Gregory-type bailout.4 6 However,
split-ups remained valid under the reenacted legislation.4 7

D. The Return of the Spin-Off 1947-1951
In response to taxpayer pressure, a special committee recommended
the reenactment of the old spin-off section.4 8 This recommendation was
40. See Whitman, supra note 37, at 1199.
41. Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U.S. 176 (1921).
42. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 203(c), 43 Stat. 256-57 (1924), codified in I.R.C. § 112
(1928); see supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
43. See Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 112(g), 45 Stat. 818 (1928); Revenue Act of 1932, ch.
209, § 112(g), 47 Stat. 197 (1932). See also supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
44. See supra text accompanying notes 4-11.
45. See supra text accompanying notes 11-13.
46. "By this method [§ 112(g)] corporations have found it possible to pay what would otherwise
be taxable dividends, without any taxes upon their shareholders. The committee believes that this
means of avoidance should be ended." H.R. REP. No. 704, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934).
47. A split-up is a distribution in which the distributing corporation is split into two subsidiary
corporations and the shareholders of the controlling/distributing corporation exchange their stock
in it for stock of one of the subsidiaries. As it is like a redemption, there is less chance that it is a

bailout.
48.

At the close of World War II, taxpayer groups began to lobby for the restoration of
tax-free spin-offs, citing the fact that split-ups legally accomplished the same things in a
more complicated manner, and pointing out that Congress should encourage the voluntary division of business enterprises into smaller units. A special committee reported to
the House Committee on Ways and Means in 1947 that the old section 112(g) from the
1932 Act should be added back into the Revenue Code.
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adopted by the House in the Revenue Bill of 1948, 4 but three provisions
were added to what had formerly been section 112(g):
(i) No preferred stock could be distributed;
(ii) After the distribution both corporations had to be engaged in a
business; and
(iii)
the transaction must not be a device for distributing earnings and
50
profits.
However, the reenactment of tax-free spin-offs was not actually accomplished until 1951 when section 112(b)(1) was added to the 1939
Code. This legislation was substantially the same as the House version in
the 1948 Revenue Bill above:
Distribution of stock not in liquidation. - If there is distributed, in
pursuance of a plan of reorganization, to a shareholder of a corporation
which is a party to the reorganization, stock (other than preferred stock) in
another corporation which is a party to the reorganization, without the surrender by such shareholder of stock, no gain to the distributee from the
receipt of such stock shall be recognized unless it appears that (A) any corporation which is a party to such reorganization was not intended to continue the active conduct of a trade or business after such reorganization, or
(B) the corporation whose stock is distributed was used principally as a
device for the distribution of earnings and profits to the shareholders of any
corporation a party to the reorganization. 5"
In debate on this 1951 enactment, a proposal of "tainting" the spunoff stock was made for the first time by Senator Humphrey on the basis
that the intent to "continue the active conduct of a trade or business after
such reorganization" was too loose a requirement.52 This'tainting proposal would have required that the spun-off stock be retained for three
years by the distributee.53 This suggestion by Senator Humphrey was rejected as unworkable. Although the 1951 provision was stricter and thus
an improvement with respect to bailouts over the simpler 1924 version of
Whitman, supra note 37, at 1202 (footnotes omitted).
49. See H.R. REP. No. 6712, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. § 128 (1948).
50. See id. at 17.
51. Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, § 317, 65 Stat. 493 (1951).
52. [... ] Senator Humphrey pointed out the fact that assets intended to be sold, if they
constituted an active business, could be incorporated, spun off, and sold thereafter avoiding both the corporate tax on sale and the dividend tax on distribution of the proceeds to shareholders. "Intent to continue in business" was too shaky a term, he felt, and
so he proposed a 'tainting' process: tax-free treatment would be conditioned on a threeyear continuation of the business by the spun-off corporation and the holding of the
spun-off stock by the original recipients for the same period.
Whitman, supra note 37, at 1205 (footnote omitted).
53. Id.
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spin-offs, it was still vulnerable and less strict than the successor and
particularly with respect to the active business
current version,
54
requirement.
E. Section 355 of the 1954 Code
As a result of the Eisenhower administration's goal of completely
reforming the 1939 Code, the House in 1954 proposed a new approach to
spin-offs based on asset characterization.5 5 This approach was rejected
for the most part.5 6 The version finally enacted in 1954 embodied the
three major and three minor requirements, described above, 7 and was
54. If the proponents of detailed articulation as a substitute for judicial flexibility thought
that these conditions would stamp out all methods of tax avoidance through the spin-off,
they were wrong. The first limitation prevented such apparently transitory businesses as
the one in Gregory from qualifying, but it did not keep a company with a large surplus
from purchasing a business to spin-off, provided that the purchased business was intended to be actively conducted. Moreover, a Treasury gloss on the statute permitted a
divisive reorganization if cash was separated from the going business, provided that
plans existed to purchase a continuing business soon after the distribution, making the
only distinction between tax-free and taxable cash spin-offs this nebulous 'plan.' Perhaps
the device clause should have been utilized to prevent this evasion, but the Treasury
apparently felt it did not cover the situation. Moreover, it was unclear whether the classic 'business purpose' and 'continuity of interest' doctrines carried over with full effect
into the spin-off area. They still bore weight with regard to the underlying reorganization, but it was arguable that Congress, by putting express conditions on the use of the
spin-off, had heeded the complaints of taxpayers asking for legislative preemption of the
field from the judicial doctrines.
Id. at 1204.
55. [A]ny separation by either of the three methods would be tax-free unless the assets of
one of the resulting corporations were 'inactive' - that is, producing more than ten
percent of its income from personal holding company sources. The penalty for producing an 'inactive' corporation was a ten-year 'taint' placed upon the separated stock, any
disposition of which, regardless of mode, would result in ordinary income treatment for
the recipient. To avoid characterization as 'inactive,' a corporation had to have been
engaged in 'active business' for five years prior to the separation, and to have maintained
separate books from the business retained by the parent.
Id. at 1206 (footnotes omitted).
56. Under the House bill, it is immaterial whether the assets are those used in an active
Your committee returns to existing law in not permitting the tax free
business ....
separation of an existing corporation into active and inactive entities. It is not believed
that the business need for this kind of transaction is sufficiently great to permit a person
in a position to afford a 10-year delay in receiving income to do so at capital gain rather
than dividend rates. Your committee requires that both the business retained by the
distributing company and the business of the corporation the stock of which is distributed must have been actively conducted for the 5 years preceding the distribution, a
safeguard against avoidance not contained in existing law.
S. RaP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 50-51 (1954).
57. See supra text accompanying notes 16-36.
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notably strengthened with respect to the active business requirement.5" If
the provisions of this new section 355 were not met, the transaction
would be treated as the taxable transaction it formally resembled, that is,
a dividend in the case of a spin-off, a redemption in the case of a split-off,
and a liquidation in the case of a split-up. 59
F.

The ProposedRegulations: 1977

The 1955 regulations were subject to some criticism. Among other
things, they purported to disallow the division of a single business' and
concentrated mainly on the technical active business requirement to the
detriment of fully exploiting the more substantively important no device
requirement. The former provision was judicially invalidated,6" and the
latter defect was addressed by the issuance in 1977 of proposed regulations, never finalized, which elaborated many examples of prohibited devices. Final regulations under section 355 dealing with issues other than
the repeal of General Utilitiesby the Tax Reform Act of 1986 were issued
in January, 1989.
V. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT SECTION 355 CASE LAW
Due to the complexity of section 355, and the serious consequences
of failing to meet its requirements, taxpayers may seek advance rulings
on proposed spin-offs. This may be one reason the case law under section
355 is relatively sparse, considering its significance. What case law there
is illustrates that the 1954 version of spin-off standards imposes requirements that are unreasonably difficult, for both taxpayers and courts, to
apply. Discussing a series of well-known section 355 precedents will amplify this point.
58. Additionally, each [of the businesses of the corporations involved in the spin-off] had
to have been actively conducted for five years prior to the separation, and neither could
have been purchased by the other during that period. These new provisions were to
prevent corporations from buying qualifying businesses with their surplus cash and then
separating off the stock, the bailout permitted, as we saw, by the 1951 Act. The five-year
rule was intended as a cordon sanitaire to prevent such bailouts from immediate execution; it was to prove an irrational and inequitable conception.
Whitman, supra note 37, at 1207-08 (footnotes omitted). See alsoinfra discussion at text accompanying notes 116-20, 166-72 (prophylactic approach of current § 355).
59. But see Telephone Answering Serv. Co., 63 T.C. 423 (1974), aff'd without opinion, 546 F.2d
423 (4th Cir. 1976) (unqualified split-up held not to constitute a liquidation), cert. denied, 431 U.S.

914 (1977).
60. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1(a) (1955).
61. See Edmund P. Coady, 33 T.C. 771 (1960), aff'd per curiam, 289 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1961).
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A. Seven Section 355 Cases
1. Good Business Expansion from Within: Lockwood 62 and
63
Burke
a. Lockwood. Lockwood v. Commissioner is the most well-known
of the nontaxable spin-off cases involving business expansion. From 1946
to 1951, Lockwood Grader Corporation of Gering, Nebraska manufactured "wash lines, potato machinery [apparently including a sorting
machine], parts and supplies" and sold these in various potato growing
areas of the central United States. Thorval and Margaret Lockwood were
the sole shareholders of Lockwood. At first Lockwood sold to potato
suppliers and shippers, but in the early 1950's it sold to individual farmers as well. Five branches were opened, in an area from Wisconsin to
into
Colorado, to manufacture and sell. In 1952 each branch was spun 6off
4
reorganization.
112
section
successful
a
in
separate corporations
The nub of the problem in Lockwood concerned operations in
Maine. In 1947, Lockwood made a few sales in the northeastern United
States. Between 1949 and 1955 most sales were through a retailer in
Presque Isle, Maine. In November, 1954, Lockwood set up a branch office in Maine. On March 1, 1956, the Maine branch office was separately
incorporated as Lockwood Graders of Maine, Inc. ("Maine, Inc."). In
return for transferring $25,000 of assets to Maine, Inc., Lockwood was
issued all 235 shares of Maine, Inc., stock. Thirty days later, on March
31, 1956, Lockwood distributed these Maine, Inc., shares to its own
shareholders, 162 to Thorval and 73 to Margaret. This distribution was
attacked by the Service as a dividend under section 301.
The statutory provision which allegedly flunked was section
355(b)(2)(B):
Section 355(b) REQUIREMENTS AS TO ACTIVE BUSINESS.(2) DEFINITION.- For purposes of paragraph (1), a corporation
shall be treated as engaged in the active conduct of a trade or business if
and only if(B) such trade or business has been actively conducted throughout the
5-year period ending on the date of the distribution ....
As the distribution of Maine, Inc., stock occurred on March 31,
1956, to satisfy this provision the Maine business must have been actively
conducted since March 31, 1951. However, "[t]he Tax Court found that
62. Estate of Thorval J. Lockwood v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 1154 (1965), 350 F.2d 712 (8th
Cir. 1965).
63. Patricia W. Burke, 42 T.C. 1021 (1964).
64. See supra text accompanying notes 47-53 (section 112 discussion and quotation).
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the Maine business was not actively and continuously conducted until
August of 1953, at which time a Lockwood salesman traveled to Maine
and personally solicited orders from farmers and businessmen .... 65
The interpretive dilemma was: (i) must the overall business which
the Maine operations were later a part have been conducted for five
years; or more strictly, (ii) must the operations in Maine themselves have
been conducted for five years? The government's reading of section
355(b)(1) 6 6 was "that the word 'and' in that section means that, in determining whether or not the active business requirement was met, one has
to look at both the business done by the distributing corporation (Lockwood) and the business done as such by the controlled corporation
(Maine, Inc.) and its predecessors in Maine."' 67 In other words, the government maintained that the particular segment of the business that was
transferred to the Maine subsidiary had to have been conducted for five
years.
The Eighth Circuit stated it was "not concerned with the prior activity of Lockwood in the northeast only, for Congress has never intimated that such a geographical test should be applied and we are not
about to apply such a test now."6 8 It rather held that:
Since there is no Congressional intent evidenced to the contrary, the
test, restated, is not whether active business had been carried out in the
geographic area later served by the controlled corporation but, simply,
whether the distributing corporation, for five years prior to distribution,
had been actively conducting the type of business now performed by the
controlled corporation without reference to the geographic area. In the instant case the facts are abundantly clear that Lockwood had been actively
engaged in the type of business later carried on by Maine, Inc., if one refers
to a national rather than just the northeastern market.69
The position of the Lockwood court is that the five-year active business rule must be interpreted broadly and pragmatically, so as to permit
the spinning-off of a business acquired in the normal course of business
operation and expansion. Stated more narrowly, the holding in Lockwood
is that the five-year active business test is not to be applied separately to
the fragmented business of the spun-off corporation alone, but rather to
65. Lockwood, 350 F.2d at 715.
66. Subsection (a) [i.e., that "no gain or loss shall be recognized"] shall apply only if either "(A) the distributing corporation, and the controlled corporation ....is engaged immediately after
the distribution in the active conduct of a trade or business .... I.R.C. § 355(b)(1).
67. Lockwood, 350 F.2d at 717.
68. Id.
69. Id. (These words should be borne in mind when Boettger v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 324
(1968), is discussed infra text accompanying notes 77-85).
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the entirety of the business of which the spun-off business was operationally an integrated part. As we shall see, this pragmatic reading of section
355 is confirmed in sections 1(b) and 370 of this part, but is rejected by
the cases discussed in sections 2 and 4 of this part.7 1
b. Burke. The facts of Burke are similar to those of Lockwood. Patricia Burke was an outside salesperson and minority shareholder of the
L.B. Walker Radio Company of Pueblo ("Walker Pueblo"). This busi-

ness was located in Pueblo, Colorado, and between 1921 and 1954 grew
from assembling radios and selling radio parts and supplies in Pueblo, to

selling radio, television, and other electronic parts and supplies and
equipment wholesale throughout southern and western Colorado and
northern New Mexico. L.B. Walker and Patricia W. Burke traveled
outside the Pueblo area soliciting orders. Subsequently, another store was

established in Grand Junction, Colorado, and all the stores were run as
an integrated operation.72
70.
71.
72.

See infra discussion at text accompanying notes 71-77, 88-90.
See infra discussion at text accompanying notes 77-88, 90-95.
After the establishment of the Grand Junction store and warehouse in 1954 but prior
to the incorporation of the store as the L.B. Walker Radio Co. of Grand Junction in
1957, the area of western Colorado around Grand Junction was served by a salesman
operating out of the Pueblo store. He would forward the orders to either Grand Junction
or Pueblo depending upon considerations such as freight charges for shipping the merchandise to the customers, the speed with which delivery could be made, and the availability of the merchandise at Pueblo or Grand Junction. Consequently when he operated
in the area west of Gunniston, Delta, Montrose, or Glenwood Springs he would usually
send his orders to Grand Junction. The Grand Junction store had no outside salesmen.
The books for both Pueblo and Grand Junction were kept in Pueblo before and after the
incorporation of Grand Junction. Separate books were not maintained for the Grand
Junction branch nor were separate complete financial statements kept, but after incorporation a separate ledger was prepared for Grand Junction. However, sufficient records
were maintained before and after incorporation in order for the Pueblo company to determine whether the Grand Junction store was profitable or not. Separate retail sales tax
returns were filed for all years prior to incorporation. Each store was treated as a stranger for purposes of intercompany transactions in order to make it easier for the employees to handle the transactions. Approximately 80 percent of the merchandise sold in
western Colorado was obtained directly from the Pueblo warehouse, the other 20 percent being shipped from the supplier directly to Grand Junction. In some instances the
sales invoice would be sent to Grand Junction while in others it would be sent to Pueblo.
If sent to Grand Junction, Pearce [the manager of the Grand Junction store] would
approve the invoice and forward it to Pueblo for payments. If the invoice were sent to
Pueblo it would be forwarded to Grand Junction for approval prior to payment. Pearce
sometimes purchased merchandise directly for the Grand Junction branch especially in
cases of emergency or when the item was not normally stocked by the Pueblo store. The
Grand Junction branch had a very limited inventory and we find that its operation was
primarily that of an outlet closer to the area of distribution. All accounts receivable,
credit matters, and collections were handled by the Pueblo store for the Grand Junction
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The area around Grand Junction, Colo., which is in the western part of
Colorado, was originally served by salesmen who operated out of the store
and warehouse located in Pueblo. As orders for merchandise were obtained
by the salesmen, they were sent to Pueblo for filling, and the merchandise
was shipped directly to the customer. The business in and around the
Grand Junction area continued to grow. In April of 1954, with the advent
of television at Grand Junction, which, it was believed, would create additional demand for television parts and supplies, the Pueblo company rented
space and established a small branch store and warehouse in Grand Junction to
better serve its customers and to further expand its business in that
73
area.

As the business grew, one Pearce, the manager of the Grand Junction store, offered to contribute land for the company's own store in
Grand Junction. To enable Pearce to make this investment, a new company, the L.B. Walker Radio Co. of Grand Junction ("Walker Grand
Junction"), was formed on January 7, 1957. Walker Pueblo transferred
assets worth $31,478 to Walker Grand Junction in exchange for 31,478
shares of stock in Walker Grand Junction. The shareholders, including
Burke, then received pro rata stock of Walker Grand Junction (presumably also in January, 1957). In April, 1957, Pearce conveyed land to
Walker Grand Junction in exchange for 3,500 shares of its stock.
Once more, the five-year test of section 355(b)(2)(B) was implicated.
Since the section 355 distribution took place in January, 1957, the active
business test referred back to a business conducted in January, 1952, and
the Commissioner contended "that the creation of a store and a warehouse in Grand Junction constituted the establishment of a separate business in 1954 and consequently that business had not been operated for
five years at the time of distribution in 1957."1 4
Following the same reasoning, the Eighth Circuit would later use in
Lockwood, the Tax Court held for the taxpayer shareholders in Burke:
[I]n the present case we find that the acquisition of a Grand Junction
store and warehouse in 1954 was only a continuation and furtherance of the
existing business and not the establishment of a new business. Consequently, the business which was divided by the spin-off in 1957 had been
actively conducted throughout the 5-year period preceding the
distribution.7 5
area. A bank account was maintained in Grand Junction only as a transfer account,
wherein cash was deposited and accumulated until the periodic transfer, usually four or
five times a month, to the main company account in Pueblo.
Burke, 42 T.C. at 1023-24.
73. Id. at 1023.
74. Id. at 1027-28.
75. Id. at 1028.
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This holding was primarily based on the close integration of operations
between the Pueblo and Grand Junction stores.7 6
Once again a court has favored a practical and lenient interpretation
of the five-year active business requirement of section 355(b), over a formal and strict interpretation. The Burke decision was relied on by the
Lockwood court.
2. Bad Business Expansion from Without. Boettger 77 and Nielsen.
Boettger and Nielsen are two important section 355 cases arising
out of the same facts. Oak Park Community Hospital, Inc., ("Oak
Park") was organized in November, 1956, to conduct a hospital business
in Stockton, California; in 1961 Oak Park purchased another hospital
business in Los Angeles. 79 The two hospitals were integrated to some
extent, with respect to accounting, legal, insurance, food, financial statements, and administration, and not integrated in a few other instances.80
A dispute arose between the seven shareholders of Oak Park with
respect to the operations of the South Side Hospital in Los Angeles. It
was agreed that the Los Angeles hospital and the Stockton hospital
would be split-up. In early 1964, the Stockton operations were transferred to Oak Park Community Hospital of Northern California ("Oak
Park North") and the Los Angeles operations to GERM Hospital, Inc.
("GERM"), two newly formed corporations. On March 31, 1964, the
78

76. In support of its holding that the Grand Junction store was merely "a continuation and
furtherance" of the existing business, the court noted that:
[i]t acted simply as a branch outlet closer to the area of distribution. Merchandise sold in
Grand Junction was usually obtained from Pueblo and was sold by Pueblo salesmen.
Over 80% of the merchandise sold in the Grand Junction area had to be shipped from
Pueblo. Merchandise was shipped directly from the suppliers only in emergency or unusual situations. It is significant that the Grand Junction store had no outside salesmen
and no bank account except for a transfer account. Also all the Grand Junction accounts
receivable, credit matters, and collections were handled by Pueblo.
Id. See supra note 72.
77. Lloyd Boettger, 51 T.C. 324 (1968).
78. Riener C. Nielsen, 61 T.C. 311 (1973).
79. On August 14, 1961, Oak Park in a taxable transaction purchased all the assets of
South Side Community Hospital, Inc., a corporation which had up to that date owned
and operated a hospital in Los Angeles, Calif. The assets acquired by Oak Park included,
inter alia, the hospital building, including the furniture, fixtures, and equipment therein,
stock in trade, good will, accounts receivable, books of account, existing licenses and
permits, and the right to conduct the business of operating a hospital in and upon the
acquired property. Oak Park's acquisition of these assets was made from its corporate
funds and no outside capital was employed. None of the owners of South Side Community Hospital, Inc. were [sic] related in any manner to any of Oak Park's stockholders.
Boettger, 51 T.C. at 326.
80. Boettger, 51 T.C. at 326-27.
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stock of Oak Park North was distributed to one group of shareholders
and that of GERM to another group.
Given that the distribution took place on March 31, 1964, satisfaction of the section 355(b) five year active business requirement would
mandate both that the South Side/GERM business have been conducted
since March 31, 1959 (section 355(b)(2)(B)), and that such trade or business not have been acquired since that date in a taxable transaction (section 355(b)(2)(C)).
The Commissioner of course focused on the August, 1961, purchase
of South Side and contended:
that GERM's post-distribution operation of the Los Angeles hospital fails
to satisfy (b)(2)(B) and (C) because that particular business was purchased
by Oak Park in a taxable transaction less than 5 years before the split-up.
More specifically, it is argued that the 5-year active-conduct rule of
(b)(2)(B) is violated because (b)(2)(C) prevents the "tacking" by Oak Park
of its predecessor, South Side Community Hospital, Inc.'s[,] period of operation of the Los Angeles hospital. Thus, the business acquired by GERM
from Oak Park had been actively conducted for
only 21/2 years, i.e., the
81
period of Oak Park's actual operation thereof.
On the other hand,
petitioners assert that the Los Angeles hospital did not constitute a separate
trade or business when operated by Oak Park, but rather that Oak Park,
during the period August 15, 1961, to March 31, 1964, conducted a single
hospital business at two locations (Los Angeles and Stockton). Thus, they
argue that the split-up of Oak Park was a split-up of one consolidated business with a longer than 5-year business history, and, therefore, they are
entitled to the benefits of section 355....
Thus the issue is logically similar to that in Burke and Lockwood. In
those two cases the narrow question was whether "such trade or business" in section 355(b)(2)(B) referred narrowly to the fragment business
spun-off, or broadly to the previously consolidated operations from
which the new fragment was spun-off. Similarly, in Boettger the issue was
whether "such trade or business" in section 355(b)(2)(C) referred narrowly to the South Side operation (which was purchased taxably within
five years), or broadly to the overall California hospital operation (which
was not acquired taxably within the five-year period). Contrary to Lockwood or Burke which chose the expansive meaning of "such trade or
business" in section (b)(2)(B), Boettger chose the narrower reading of
81.
82.

Boettger, 51 T.C. at 329.
Id.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

that same phrase in section (b)(2)(C). 3 Presumably the phrase has the
same meaning in both subparagraphs. In essence the Boettger court felt,

for some inarticulated reason, that the interpretation by the Lockwood
and Burke courts of the phrase in section (b)(2)(B) was not relevant to

the correct interpretation of the same phrase in section (b)(2)(C). 4
Although the court's treatment of the earlier precedents was less
than satisfactory, it did have a rationale for its narrow reading of the

phrase "such trade or business." It was necessary to avoid "the simple
expedient of a corporation purchasing a going business as a temporary

investment in anticipation of the distribution of that business to its shareholders in a tax-free corporate division under section 355.''8s

This reasoning raises interesting issues. Why could it ever be more
of a bailout to spin-off or split-up a business established by external ac83.

In the instant case, the trade or business being conducted by Germ after Oak Park's
distribution of the Germ stock is that of operating the Los Angeles hospital, which is the
same business that Oak Park acquired in a concededly taxable transaction 2 1/2 years
earlier. In our opinion, the fact that for 2 '/2
years, the Los Angeles hospital might have
been operated in such a manner as to constitute an integral part of Oak Park's previous
business is irrelevant in determining whether the distribution herein should be tax free.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
84. At least the opinion implied as much. See id. at 330 n.7.
85. [P]etitioners' theory herein, proceeding on the assumption that a corporation may
acquire a going business in a taxable transaction, the stock of which could thereafter be
distributed tax free under section 355, based on the fact that the business was conducted
for a period of time less that 5 years as part of the previously existing corporate business
of the acquiring corporation, must fail in the face of the clear statutory language of
section 355(b)(2)(C). That provision, enacted to prevent the 'bailing out' of accumulated
earnings by the simple expedient of a corporation purchasing a going business as a temporary investment in anticipation of the distribution of that business to its shareholders
in a tax-free corporate division under section 355, dictates the result in this case where a
distribution of the purchased business occurred only 2 '/2
years after its acquisition. (Of
course this reasoning is circular with respect to the meaning of "such trade or business"
in (b)(2)(C) - if it refers to the overall California hospital business, then that business
was not acquired taxably within five years].
If petitioners' position in the instant case were to succeed, the application of section
355(b)(2)(C) would be avoided by the happenstance that Oak Park acquired a second
hospital rather than some other corporate business. Surely, if Oak Park had acquired a
bowling alley in a taxable transaction and 2 '/2years later separately distributed the
stock of the hospital and the bowling alley, those distributions would not be within the
ambit of section 355. The fact that by either accident or design, Oak Park acquired
another hospital business should not entitle it to any different result.
We reach our conclusion with full realization that this case does not present a purposeful attempt to 'bail-out' corporate earnings by acquisition of a business for later
distribution.
Id. at 330-31 (footnotes omitted).
Note that the IRS position in Boettger and Nielson may have recently been reversed as reflected in
the final 1989 regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(c), Ex. 8 (1989).
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quisition as opposed to internal expansion? Why should it matter
whether or not the spun-off business has an integral relation to the older
business? In short, what does the nature, history, and structure of the
distributing and controlled corporations' businesses have to do with the
evil of a Gregory-type bailout, which I earlier suggested was primarily a
step transaction? In Boettger, as well as in Burke and Lockwood, the evil
step is missing.
As mentioned earlier, the Nielsen case involved the same facts, businesses, and corporate transactions as the Boettger case. The Nielsen case,
however, was decided five years later and on the basis of section
355(b)(2)(B) primarily rather than section 355(b)(2)(C), though the latter
ground was briefly mentioned. The similarity between Nielsen and
Burke/Lockwood was thus stronger as the same subparagraph of section
355(b) was involved. The Nielsen court held that the two hospital businesses were not integrated because there was a lack of integration of operations between the two facilities.8 6 This holding may be factually
unsatisfying, 87 and raise even more questions about the sense of the fiveyear active conduct rule, but it is at least logically consistent with Burke
and Lockwood, in that it implicitly admitted that "such trade or business" in both section (b)(2)(B) and (b)(2)(C) might refer broadly to the
"trunk" of the original business rather than only to its younger branch.
3. Good Feeding of a Second Business: Example 7 88 In the "active business" portion of the regulations, there is an example of an urban
department store that builds a branch in the suburbs; within three years
the suburban store is spun off.8 9 Although this example is listed as an
Where was no integration of the income-producing activities of each hospital. The
medical staff and patients of each hospital were mutually exclusive. One hospital could
hardly be called the branch operation of the other. We think this fact distinguishes the
present case from Patricia W. Burke, supra, and Lockwood's Estate v. Commissioner,
supra, upon which petitioner's rely. Each hospital had the requisite assets and employees
for the production of income, and each was a self-sufficient operation. The things which
the hospitals had in common.., might have been shared by any two totally dissimilar
businesses owned by one person.
Nielsen, 61 T.C. at 317-18.
87. Compare supra text accompanying note 80 (degree of integration in Boettger) with supra
notes 72, 76 (degree of integration in Burke).
88. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(c), Ex. (7) (1989).
89. For the past nine years, corporation X has owned and operated a department store in
the downtown area of the City of G. Three years ago, X acquired a parcel of land in a
suburban area of G and constructed a new department store on it. X transfers the suburban store and related business assets to new subsidiary Y and distributes the stock of Y
to X's shareholders.... [Alfter the distribution, each store has its own manager and is
86.
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illustration of the five-year active business test, there is no suggestion
elsewhere in the regulations that it would not also pass the no device
requirement.
I assume that the initial establishment of the second store was fed by
the earnings from the first store. Contrast this with the following
authority.
4. Bad Feeding of a Second Business: Revenue Ruling 59-400.11
After fourteen years of operating a hotel business, a company began the
purchase of improved real estate property, which it used to conduct a
real estate rental business for the next twenty years. After four additional
years an office building was constructed for rental, largely from the profits of the hotel business.9" On its surface this appears to be simply a more
expansive description of the "feeding" in Example 7, above. In this case,
however, the following distribution was taxable. 92
The ruling does not make clear which provision of section 355 is not
operated independently of the other store. X and Y both satisfy the requirements of
section 355(b). See paragraph (b)(3)(i) and (ii) of this section.

Id.
90.
91.

Rev. Rul. 59.400, 1959-2 C.B. 114.
Advice has been requested whether a distribution of stock by a corporation engaged in
the hotel and real estate business qualifies under the nontaxable provision of section 355
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
M corporation was engaged in two businesses, opera'ting a hotel and renting improved
real estate (both commercial and residential). The hotel business was started upon organization in 1920 and has been actively conducted up to the present time. In 1934, M
corporation also entered into the rental real estate business when it purchased property,
constructed a garage and automobile agency facilities thereon and rented it to a dealer.
In the intervening years, it acquired other rental properties which it has continued to
operate. In 1954, the hotel had a fair market value of 550x dollars and a net book value
of 350x dollars. The rental properties had a fair market value of 305x dollars and net
book value of 167x dollars.
During the five-year period commencing with 1954, the operation of the hotel business resulted in earnings, after taxes, of 240x dollars, and the operation of the real estate
business resulted in earnings of approximately 75x dollars. In 1958, a new rental office
building was built for 400x dollars, some 175x dollars thereof being provided by loans
from banks. At the beginning of 1959, the hotel business was placed in a new corporation N, and the stock thereof distributed to the shareholders of M on a pro rata basis. N
corporation received the hotel, plus certain receivables and other hotel business assets.
M corporation retained the real estate liabilities and assets, which at that time had a net
book value of 372x dollars and a fair market value of 705x dollars.

Id.
92. It is the position of the Internal Revenue Service that where a corporation which is
devoted to one type of business also engages in the rental business, and substantial acquisitions of new rental property are made within the five-year period preceding the separation of these businesses, a 'spin-off' transaction will not qualify under section 355 unless
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satisfied,9" though it does vaguely suggest that the distribution may be a
device. Similarly, the ruling implies that what is objectionable is not the
formal economic relationship between the two businesses, but rather the
nature of the second rental real estate business. This is curious because
there is no intimation that insufficient services are performed with respect to the real estate so that it would fail to constitute an active business, 94 nor is there in the regulations any indication that the distribution
of stock in a rental real estate business is a device. 95 Therefore, the objectionable feature of the spin-off in the revenue ruling is not precisely
identified.
5. Valid Business Purpose: Parshelsky.96 Moses Parshelsky was
the sole shareholder of Parshelsky Brothers, Inc., ("Brothers") which operated a wholesale lumber business in Brooklyn on property it owned,

consisting of a one-story building with 50,000 square feet in which wood
trim was stored for sale to local wholesalers and builders. In the early
1950's sales declined, costs increased, and net income also declined. Nevertheless, current assets remained high and liabilities were reduced as
Brothers had deliberately built up its liquid assets9 7 and paid an accumulated earnings tax.
it can be shown that the property acquisitions were substantially financed out of the
earnings of the rental business and not out of the earnings of the other business.
From the facts presented herein, it is readily apparent that there has been a very
substantial increase in the rental properties subsequent to 1954, primarily as a result of
the addition of the large office building in 1958. Further, it is also apparent that, viewing
the transaction most favorably to the taxpayer, earnings properly attributable to the
hotel business, in the amount of approximately 150x dollars, have been employed in
increasing the real estate business. In view of this substantial financing out of the earnings of the hotel business, it is held that the distribution of the stock of N corporation to
the shareholders of M corporation will not qualify as a nontaxable distribution under
section 355 of the Code.
Id.
93. Does this mean that a bailout can occur merely by the building up of a business within the
controlling corporation that the shareholders would like to invest in? If so, it is not clear why that is
not an evil so long as the two businesses remain in one corporate shell, but becomes an evil upon
separation and distribution, even when no sale or liquidation occurs. This relates to the prophylactic
orientation of § 355. See infra discussion of text accompanying notes 116-20, and notes 166-72.
94. See, eg., Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(c) Ex. (12) (1989).
95. Unless the rental real estate is considered a liquid asset. See Treas. Reg. § 1.3552(d)(2)(iv)(B) (1989).
96. Estate of Parshelsky v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1962).
97. "The corporation had built up its liquid assets and was improving its net asset position.
Total current assets, more than one-half of which were United States Treasury notes, remained at
approximately $1,400,000 from 1950 to 1954 while current liabilities fell from $181,000 to $16,000."
Id. at 16.
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Because of the decline in net profits and because in 1953 he was 79
years old, Parshelsky became concerned about the disposition of the business after his death. His will provided that certain of his key employees
could purchase Parshelsky Brothers' inventory, fixtures, equipment, and
customer lists at favorable prices and could use the real estate at a favorable
rental. Although he hoped that his employees would
98 carry on the business,
he did not want his name to be connected with it.
In late 1953 Parshelsky organized Parshelsky Realties, Inc., ("Realties");
on January 4, 1954, Brothers transferred the real estate to Realties,
which leased it back to Brothers for five years.99
The key question in the case was the purpose of the transfer to Realties and of the distribution of the Realties stock. Several reasons were
offered by Parshelsky's attorney at trial, but the Tax Court rejected all of
these and held that as there was no corporate purpose for the reorganization, the transaction was therefore a device for the distribution of earnings and profits."ic
98. Id. (footnote omitted).
99. Brothers transferred the real estate to Realties in exchange for all of the latter's capital
stock which was immediately distributed to Parshelsky, the sole shareholder of Parshelsky Brothers. Simultaneously with the carrying out of this exchange, Realties leased
the real estate back to Parshelsky Brothers for five years at an annual rental of $42,000
with an option to renew for an additional five years.
Id. Note that this distribution was not governed by § 355 but by the predecessor § 112(b)(1) of the
1939 Code, see supra text accompanying notes 48-51.
100. Moses L. Parshelsky, 34 T.C. 946 (1960), rev'd and remanded, 303 F.2d 14 (1962). Note
that there is often a confusingly close relationship between the business purpose test and the no
device test as these are interpreted by courts, see Marne S. Wilson, 42 T.C. 914 (1964), rev'd, 353
F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1965); see Whitman, supra note 37, at 1244-45 (footnotes omitted). There is some
blurring between the use of the "business purpose" and "no device" requirements. Although it is
arguable that the intent of Congress in inserting the no device language was to make that a primary
tool of enforcement against bailout, the Service has tended to rely primarily on the business purpose
requirement. Id. Although one may speculate that the actual subjective reasoning of courts is to first
seek a business purpose, and then to find that there is no device when such a business purpose is
found, the actual language of court opinions using both requirements is confusing. In Judge Raum's
opinion for the tax court in Marne S. Wilson, 42 T.C. 914 (1964), rev'd, 353 F.2d 184 (9th Cir.
1965), the court in a sense blended the two requirements by requiring the taxpayer to prove the
nonexistence of a device by advancing "business reasons" - a phrase obviously different from but
clearly related to "business purpose" - in favor of the spin-off. The court held that the advanced
business purposes were not adequate to meet the burden of proof, and yet, that the transaction was
not a device. This seems to suggest the contrary form of reasoning, in other words, if the transaction
is not a device, then a business purpose will not be required, rather than the alternate method of
combining the two requirements, that is to say that if a business purpose is found a device will not be
held to exist. But see Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(3)(ii) (1989) (in the new final regulations, corporate
business purpose is affirmative evidence of nondevice).
Apparently missing the point of Judge Raum's doctrinal innovation, the Ninth Circuit construed
the Tax Court opinion (finding business reasons inadequate to rebut a device, but there was no
device anyway) to mean instead that there was no business purpose to the transaction (the require-
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The Second Circuit reversed and remanded the decision to the Tax
Court because of a basic disagreement over what might be a valid business purpose:
We find, therefore, that the Tax Court erred in this case when it examined only those reasons for the reorganization "relating to the business
being carried on by the corporation, or relating otherwise to the corporation's organization and functioning" and refused to examine those "arising
from and serving only the personal or noncorporate-business interests of the
shareholders." 10 1
In particular, the Second Circuit suggested that a personal estate
planning purpose of Parshelsky might be valid.102 This view rested, first,
on a belief that the requirement of a business purpose meant primarily "a
shorthand expression for the Gregory-type statutory interpretation process,"'10 3 and second, on the observation that the distinction between corporate and shareholder purposes is artificial in the case of a close
corporation." ° Whatever the precise foundation of the Second Circuit's
holding, it clearly accepts as valid a pure shareholder purpose for satisfying the need identified in case law and regulations for there to be a valid
business purpose for a reorganization and distribution under section 355.
6. Invalid Business Purpose: Rafferty." 5 The holding of this case,
on the validity for section 355 of a pure shareholder estate planning purpose, is precisely contrary to that of Parshelsky.
Joseph Rafferty owned all outstanding shares of Rafferty Brown
Steel Co., Inc., ("RBS") a Massachusetts corporation processing and distributing cold rolled sheet and strip steel. In May, 1960, Rafferty organment not emphasized by the Tax Court opinion), and therefore, that while the transaction was not a
device, that it was still not a permitted tax free spin-off. The final regulations expressly retain the
independent business purpose requirement even if the transaction is not a device. See T.D. 8238
1989-8 I.R.B. 5 (Release accompanying final regulations, Jan. 5, 1989) at 6.
101. Parshelsky, 303 F.2d at 19 (citation omitted).
102. The final reason, that Parshelsky wanted the real estate to be readily available to his
executors as a separate asset of his estate, has more weight. Parshelsky left his residuary
estate to the Moses L. Parshelsky Foundation, a charitable institution, which would
channel the assets to various charities. To the extent that Parshelsky wanted the real
estate and operating business to go to different legatees, his aim appears to be within the
legislative purpose of the spin-off provision. In order to carry out this non-tax-avoidance
purpose the ownership of the real estate and operating assets would have to be separated
at the shareholder level.
Id. at 21.
103. Id. at 18. The meaning of this definition is not clear. Perhaps it equates the presence of a
business purpose with the absence of a principal tax avoidance purpose. See supra note 100.
104. Id. at 19.
105. Rafferty v. Commissioner, 452 F.2d 767 (1st Cir. 1971).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

ized Teragram Realty Co., Inc., ("Teragram") and in June RBS
transferred the real estate of its Massachusetts manufacturing plant to

Teragram in exchange for all of Teragram's stock. In 1965, Teragram
also purchased some unimproved real estate in Connecticut and built a
plant there to be leased to Rafferty Brown Steel Co., Inc., of Connecticut
("RBS Conn") a company formed in 1962 to carry on operations in Waterbury, Connecticut.

From 1960 through 1965 Teragram derived all its income from rent
paid by RBS and RBS Conn; in June 1965 the earned surplus of RBS
Conn was over $530,000. In August, 1965, RBS distributed its Teragram
stock to Rafferty.
The First Circuit observed that the purpose of this reorganization

and distribution, which attempted to come under section 355, was to give
Rafferty's daughters a steady stream of income, while keeping them out
of the steel business. 106 As in the Wilson case,1 7 the discussion of valid
business purpose was treated as probative of the transaction's not being a
device, rather than being a purely independent requirement.' 0 8 This estate planning purpose was rejected by the First Circuit, both on its own
strength and because of its heavily personal nature.10 9
106.
On various occasions Rafferty consulted his accountant about estate planning, particularly about the orderly disposition of RBS. While he anticipated that his sons would
join him at RBS, he wanted to exclude his daughters (and/or his future sons-in-law)
from the active management of the steel business. He wished, however, to provide them
with property which would produce a steady income. The accountant recommended the
formation of Teragram, the distribution of its stock and the eventual use of this stock as
future gifts to the Rafferty daughters. The taxpayers acted on this advice and also on the
accountant's opinion that the distribution of Teragram stock would meet the requirements of § 355.
Id. at 769 (footnotes omitted).
107. See supra note 100.
108.
We turn first to the Tax Court's finding that there was no device because there was
an adequate business purpose for the separation and distribution of Teragram stock.
Initially, we are disturbed by the somewhat uncritical nature of the Tax Court's finding
of a business purpose. Viewing the transaction from the standpoint of RBS, RBS Conn.,
or Teragram, no immediate business reason existed for the distribution of Teragram's
stock to the taxpayers.
Rafferty, 452 F.2d at 769 (citations omitted). See supra note 100.
109.
In the case at bar there was, at best, only an envisaged possibility of future debilitating nepotism [i.e., future interference with the business by future sons-in-law]. If avoidance of this danger could be thought a viable business purpose at all, it was so remote
and so completely under the taxpayers' control that if, in other respects the transaction
was a 'device', that purpose could not satisfy the taxpayer's burden of proving that it was
not being used 'principally as a device' within the meaning of the statute.
Our question, therefore, must be whether taxpayers' desire to put their stockholdings
into such form as would facilitate their estate planning, viewed in the circumstances of
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As the footnoted quotation indicates," l° the transaction's potential
as a device-in that it set the stage for (though it did not accomplish) a
Gregory-type bailout-was weighed against the transaction and the taxpayers' purpose."1 ' Therefore, the lack of corporate purpose and the
presence of a possible bailout (which possibility the court equated with
actual presence of a device) played a joint part in the determination. As
the court observed:
In the absence of any direct benefit to the business of the original company, and on a showing that the spin-off put saleable assets in the hands of
the taxpayers, the continued retention of which was not needed to continue
the business enterprise, or to accomplish taxpayers' purposes, we find no
sufficient factor to overcome the Commissioner's determination that the
12
distribution was principally a device to distribute earnings and profits.
Finally, to point out the contrasting analyses of Parshelsky and Rafferty, both cases involved the separation of rental real estate from the
operations of the businesses using the real estate. This was seen as evithe case, was a sufficient personal business purpose to prevent the transaction at bar from
being a device for the distribution of earnings and profits. [A] purpose of a shareholder,
qua shareholder, may in some cases save a transaction from condemnation as a device,
[but] we do not agree with the putative suggestion in Estate of Parshelsky that any investment purpose of the shareholders is sufficient....
That is not to say that a taxpayer's personal motives cannot be considered, but only
that a distribution which has considerable potential for use as a device for distributing
earnings and profits should not qualify for tax-free treatment on the basis of personal
motives unless those motives are germane to the continuance of the corporate business.
Id. at 770.
110. See supra note 109.
111. Perhaps this point and the following language elaborating it help explain the reasoning of
the revenue ruling discussed above. See supra text accompanying notes 90-95:
Given such a purpose, the only question remaining is whether the substance of the
transaction is such as to leave the taxpayer in a position to distribute the earnings and
profits of the corporation away from, or out of the business. The first factor to be considered is how easily the taxpayer would be able, were he so to choose, to liquidate or sell
the spun-off corporation. Even if both corporations are actively engaged in theL respective trades, if one of them is a business based principally on highly liquid investmenttype, passive assets, the potential for a bail-out is real. The question here is whether the
property transferred to the newly organized corporation had a readily realizable value,
so that the distributee-shareholders could, if they wished, 'obtain such cash or property
or the cash equivalent thereof, either by selling the distributed stock or liquidating the
corporation, thereby converting what would otherwise be dividends into capital gain
.... ' In this connection we note that the Tax Court found that a sale of Teragram's real
estate properties could be 'easily arranged'. Indeed taxpayers themselves stressed the fact
that the buildings were capable of multiple uses.
Id. at 771 (citations omitted). See also infra text accompanying notes 114-20, and notes 166-72 (issue
of ease of subsequent sale; prophylactic purpose of § 355).
112. Rafferty, 452 F.2d at 771.
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dence of a device, an inactive business, and lack of a business purpose in
Rafferty, but not in Parshelsky. More importantly, the weight that might
permissibly be given to a pure shareholder purpose was much greater in
Parshelsky than in Rafferty, amounting almost to a downright contradiction between the two cases.
B. Analysis of Problems in section 355 Authority and Case Law
In review of the seven section 355 authorities, Lockwood and Burke
held that expansion from within was good, and a business so acquired
might be non-taxably spun-off. Boettger and Nielsen held, on the other
hand, that a business acquired wholesale by purchase, expansion from
without, might not be spun-off free of tax. Implicitly Lockwood and
Burke raised the feeding issue, in that presumably whatever funds were
required for expansion into Maine and Grand Junction, respectively,
came from the pre-existing business operations. The issue of feeding was
raised explicitly by Example 7 and the revenue ruling. In the former case
the feeding of a new department store by an older store was permitted,
while in the second case the feeding of a newer real estate business by an
older hotel business was not permitted. Finally, Parshelsky and Rafferty
disagree over the extent to which a purely personal shareholder purpose
may justify a spin-off.
Note that, save for the last two cases, it would be going too far to
say that these authorities are totally inconsistent or incoherent. The holdings can be distinguished.1 13 The important question is, "Do these authorities make a good deal of sense?" What do I mean in suggesting that
these cases do not make a good deal of sense? I intend two points, one at
a doctrinal level and another at a policy level.
First, at a doctrinal level, the cases make implicit suggestions about
spin-offs that raise questions. Why is the acquisition of a business from
without so much more suspicious, or conducive to a bailout, compared to
acquisition from within by internal reinvestment of earnings, that the latter may be spun-off freely while the former must wait five years for a taxfree spin-off? Why is there such an inability to police later sales or liquidations that, as in the revenue ruling, the meaning of "liquid assets"
(which suggests a device) is broadened from its normal sense and mixed
with business purpose considerations, as in Rafferty and Wilson?
113. For example, Boettger and Nielsen can be reconciled with Lockwood and Burke on the basis
of a consistent reading of the meaning of "such trade or business" in § 355(b)(2), but distinguished
factually on the basis that the hospital businesses were not fully integrated in Boettger and Nielsen.
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The answer to some of these questions anticipates the prophylactic
policy point raised in the following paragraph from Rafferty:
Given such a purpose, the only question remaining is whether the substance of the transaction is such as to leave the taxpayer in a position to
distribute the earnings and profits of the corporation away from, or out of
the business. The first factor to be considered is how easily the taxpayer
would be able, were he so to choose, to liquidate or sell the spun-off corporation. Even if both corporations are actively engaged in their respective
trades, if one of them is a business based principally on highly liquid investment-type, passive assets, the potential for a bail-out is real. The question
here is whether the property transferred to the newly organized corporation
had a readily realizable value, so that the distributee-shareholders could, if
they wished, 'obtain such cash or property or the cash equivalent thereof,
either by selling the distributed stock or liquidating the corporation,
thereby converting what would otherwise be dividends into capital gain
.... ' In this connection we note that the Tax Court found that a sale of
Teragram's real estate properties could be 'easily arranged.' Indeed taxpayers themselves
stressed the fact that the buildings were capable of multiple
114
uses ....

Many questions are asked in the preceding paragraph, but are answered by the suggestion that semi-passive or semi-liquid businesses,
such as rental real estate, or businesses recently acquired from without,
have a more readily ascertainable fair market value and thus might be
more easily sold post-distribution." 5 I doubt whether this is a sufficient
reason for prohibiting the tax-free spin-off of such businesses. Ascertainability of fair market value is likely to be a small impediment or
inducement to the sale of a business given a willing buyer and seller.
What then accounts for such weight placed on so slender a factor?
There is a middle level answer to the question (In what way do these
cases not make a good deal of sense?) which in turn suggests a larger
114. Rafferty, 452 F.2d at 771. See also infra text accompanying notes 114-20 & 166-173 (issue
of ease of subsequent sale; prophylactic purpose of § 355).
115. It seems to be widely assumed that spinning off passive assets, or a passive entity, is bad.
See Note, Section 355"s Active Business Rule - An Outdated Inefficacy, 24 VAND. L. REV. 955
(passim) (1971): As a theoretical matter, it is hard to see what the objection to a passive entity is so
long as there is no post-distribution sale or liquidation. As a historical matter it is possible to see
how this notion arose. In § 112(b)(1)(A) of the 1939 Code, which re-enacted tax-free spin-offs in
1951, it is provided that a spin-off will not be tax-free if "any corporation which is a party to such
reorganization was not intended to continue the active conduct of a trade or business after such
reorganization.
... Id. It is plausible that the original thought behind, and emphasis of, this
provision was to preclude a post-distribution liquidation; by the time the prophylactically inclined
1954 version of this provision was passed the words "active conduct" had become a base on which to
build an unnecessary focus on the nature of the spun-off business. See infra text accompanying notes
167-72 (discussing prophylactic approach of § 355).
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question. That is, the whole approach of the statute, regulations, and case
law is extremely prophylactic. In other words, they are designed not only
to penalize bailouts by taxing distributions constituting a bailout, but
also to penalize those transactions which could be used subsequently to
bail out earnings even though they themselves stop short of accomplishing that end.
What evidence is there of this prophylactic definition of a bailout?
The regulations suggest the following definition of a bailout:
Section 355 recognizes that a tax-free distribution of the stock of a
controlled corporation presents a potential for tax avoidance by facilitating
the avoidance of the dividend provisions of the Code through the subsequent sale or exchange of stock
of one corporation and the retention of the
11 6
stock of another corporation.
This is echoed by the following example:
The purpose of the requirement that the transaction not be used as a
device for the distribution of earnings and profits is a recognition of the
potential that a distribution of stock under section 355 possesses for a
bailout of earnings at capital gain rates. For example, a corporation with
accumulated earnings and profits may be operating rental property with a
readily realizable market value. Rather than distribute dividends in the
form of cash, the corporation might transfer the rental property to a new
corporation in a tax-free transaction under section 351 in exchange for the
shares of such new corporation and then distribute the shares to its shareholders. The shareholders could then sell these shares, recognizing capital
gain instead of ordinary income, and would then be in virtually the identical position they would have been in had there been a cash distribution of
dividends. That this is clearly the type of transaction
at which the device
17
clause of section 355 is aimed is undisputed.
The plain fact is that this confuses the "near occasion of sin" (the
distribution of stock) with the "sin" itself (the bailout). With a bailout
there is an economic realization; that is, the transformation of the stock
investment into tangible assets or cash, by liquidation or sale, at capital
gain rates. This is made apparent by the following description of Gregory:
In Gregory v. Helvering, however, the Supreme Court held that full
compliance with the letter of the spin-off statute was not enough if the
transaction was otherwise indistinguishable from an ordinary dividend. The
taxpayer, Mrs. Gregory, owned all of the stock of United Mortgage Corp.,
which held certain assets she wished to sell to a third party. United Mortgage transferred these assets to Averill Corp., newly organized for the pur116. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(1) (1989). See also text accompanying note 113.
117. Helfand & Lafving, Fillingthe Serbonian Bog With Quicksand: ProposedSection 355 Regu.
lations Further Obscure CorporateSeparations-PartI, 5 J. CORP. TAx'N 345, 348 (1979).
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pose, in consideration for which Averill issued all of its shares to Mrs.
Gregory [sic]. A few days later, Averill was dissolved, its assets were distributed to Mrs. Gregory, and she was able to sell them to the third party.
A deficiency was determined on the theory that the net result of the steps
just described was an ordinary dividend distribution of the assets by United
Mortgage to Mrs. Gregory, and that the "reorganization" provisions of the
1924 Revenue Act should 1be
1 8 confined to transactions having some purpose

other than tax avoidance.

It seems clear that if Mrs. Gregory had not dissolved Averill, or sold
it, there would have been no evil to remedy. It is also suggested that the
real nature of the evil is a step transaction-a distribution of stock followed closely by a cash-in." 9 This is presumably why the regulations
penalize pre-arranged sales, particularly, as these most nearly resemble
step transactions.
My own suggested conception of a bailout is alternative to this prophylactic approach. That is, simply put, that a bailout is merely a step
transaction which combines two unobjectionable steps which become objectionable because of their proximity. I take it as a plausible if unproven
axiom that had Mrs. Gregory held on to her Averill stock the transaction
would not have been attacked. 120 I also take it as axiomatic that when a
shareholder ordinarily sells stock in, or liquidates a corporation, there is
no objection to treating the result as capital gain. It is the combination of
the two steps that constitutes the resemblance to a dividend and makes
the transaction a bailout.
As suggested in Part VII, below, this step transaction characterization of bailouts means that all along there has been a simpler option
available to prevent bailouts than section 355's complexity, namely a
stock taint. "21 Why has this option not been chosen? There are specific
118. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 13-5 (4th ed. 1979 & Supp. 1986).
119. It might be asked why the receipt of the Monitor stock itself was an evil or a realization
event; see infra discussion at text accompanying notes 153-54.
120. In this connection see the following passage by Whitman:
Disposition of the stock received in a separation or of the retained stock of the distributing corporation - whether by sale, redemption, or liquidation is essential to the success
of an earnings bailout; if the recipient continues to hold his interest in both corporations,
he resembles the classic example of the investor with two different tickets for the same
assets he had before, the man for whom tax-free separations were established.
Whitman, supra note 37, at 1246.
121. This is not an original suggestion, see infra text accompanying notes 178-79. It could be
pointed out that there is already a form of taint in § 355 as it now exists, to the extent that there is a
continuity of interest requirement that applies to spin-offs. See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c) (1989); Rev.
Rul. 79-293, 1979-2 C.B. 125; Rev. Rul. 69-293, 1969-1 C.B. 102.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

practical objections to a stock taint, but I believe the primary reason a
complex solution such as section 355 was chosen-in short, a prophylactic approach which not only penalizes bailouts, but also penalizes transactions which might facilitate a later hypothetical bailout-is a policy
point, that is, because a bailout is an ambiguous concept. The concept of
a bailout is ambiguous because it is the accretion of several underlying
concepts that are themselves ambiguous or not clearly defined. Capital
gain is a confused concept, and on it rests corporate conversion which is
further confused, and on top of these rests the distinction between dividend and non-dividend distributions which is additionally obscure. Added to the confusion of these concepts is the concept of a reorganization,
which is also problematic. The result is that the concept of a bailout is
difficult and indeterminate, and this quality of a bailout led the drafters
of section 355 to draw an extra and expanded circle of protection around
bailouts to prohibit, not only bailouts, but any transaction that might
facilitate a bailout.
VI.

CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS UNDERLYING SECTION 355

Section 355 is directed against "bailouts," the illicit conversion of
what ought to be taxed as an ordinary income dividend into a capital
gain disposition. To this extent, section 355 is based on a set of notions
whose structures are shaky in several respects. The concepts of capital
gain,12 2 the permissible conversion of ordinary income into capital gains
through the corporate entity of doing business, and the notions of a dividend and a tax-free reorganization or distribution are not at all clear or
unambiguous. Whether or not a capital gains preference is ever restored,123 these policies must be considered to illustrate why the present
form of section 355 never made any sense even when, with the availability of capital gains, bailouts were possible.
For an overview of the legal doctrines involved in capital gains and discussed herein see 2
FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFrs 51-1 to 51-34, 51-53 to 51-86
(1981 & Supp. 1986); Gallagher, CapitalGains andLosses: 4 Primer,Parts One and Two, 7 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1, 199 (1979).
123. See S. REP. No. 99-313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 169 (1986); 35 TAX NOTES 229 (April 20,
1987); 36 TAX NOTES 563-65 (Aug. 10, 1987). Although President Bush's reinstatement of a capital
gains preference, passed by the House in H.R. 3299, was rejected in the Senate, the President and the
House are likely to push for some form of capital gains relief again in 1990. See Jones, Bush Raises
Beige Flagon CapitalGains: ReconciliationHeld Hostage to Debt Limits, 45 TAX NOTES 655 (Nov.
6, 1989); Davenport & Jones, Reconcilation Creeps Along: Capital Gains Makes First Senate Floor
Appearance, 45 TAX NOTES 511 (Oct. 30, 1989); Rosenthal, Deficit Hurdle: Drop-Kicking Todays
Issues Through Tomorrows Goal Posts, 45 TAX NOTES 800 (Nov. 13, 1989).
122.

B. BrrrKER,
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Capital Gains

1. In General As noted earlier, it is important to discuss capital
gain not only because it is central to understanding bailouts, but because
the entire capital gain structure remains in the Code124 and because the
preference may be restored.
To begin with, the virtue or vice of capital gain is a sharply disputed
topic. 125 This is not only because of the issue of its economic effect, 126 but
127
also because the policy justification has always been ambiguous,
and
28
its doctrinal implementation overly complex and confused.1
Policies said to justify the capital gain preference have at various
times included a remedy for inflation, a remedy for bunching, 129 a rem124. See, eg., netting rules, capital loss limitations. See also supra text accompanying note 122
and note 122.
125. For an argument in favor of the preference, see Katsoris, In Defense of Capital Gains, 42
FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1973). For arguments for repealing the preference, see 1 OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH 76, 100-105 (1984); 2 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 178-88 (1984); Waggoner, Eliminat-

ing the Capital Gains Preference, Part 1" The Problems of Inflation, Bunching, and Lock-In, 48 U.
COLO. L. REV. 313 (1977); Wetzler, CapitalGains and Losses, in COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION 115-62 (J. Pechman ed. 1977). For a summary of arguments for and against the preference, see

Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital GainsArguments, 35 TAXES 247 (1957).
126.

For discussion of the economic effect of the preference, see Bhatia, Capital Gains, The

Distribution of Income, and Taxation, 27 NAT'L TAX J. 319 (1974); M. DAVID, ALiERNATIVE
APPROACHES TO CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION 1-42, 60-108 (1968); R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL
INCOME TAX 194-98 (1964); Wetzler, supra note 125, at 115.
127. See generally Miller, The "CapitalAsset" Concept:A Critique ofCapital Gains Taxation:II,
59 YALE L. J. 1057 (1950).
128. See generally Dean, Capital Gain and OrdinaryIncome- Problems in Transmutation, 24
N.Y.U. PROC. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1291 (1966); Tucker, The Warren Court: Its Impact on

the Capital v& Ordinary Concept Under the Internal Revenue Code, 17 KAN. L. REV. 53 (1968);
Note, The Troubled Distinction Between Capital Gain and Ordinary Income, 73 YALE L.J. 693
(1964); Note, Capital Gains: Can the Confusion Be Eliminated?,49 IOWA L. REV. 89 (1963).
129. See Groves, Taxation of CapitalGains, in HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2 TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 1193 (Committee Print 1959); U.S. TREASURY DEP'T,
TAX ADVISORY STAFF OF THE SECRETARY, FEDERAL INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL
GAINS AND LOSSES 13 (1951); A. L. I., DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS IN CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION 7-

8, 10-12, 187-89 (Discussion draft 1960); Shores, Reexamining the Relationship Between Capital
Gain and the Assignment of Income, 13 IND. L. REV. 463, 464-65 (1980); Note, supra note 128, at
696-97; Note supra note 128, at 100-02.
Bunching may be described as follows:
the oppressive effects which the progressive tax rate structure would have on accrued
gain bunched into the year of sale. The preference supposedly provides a crude form of
income averaging, more closely approximating the tax which would have been due if it
had been imposed as the gain accrued. The preference is also said to be economically
beneficial in that the removal of the bunching burden imposed by progressive rates on
accrued income encourages the disposition of those items defined as capital assets.
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edy for lock-in,13 ° and an incentive for risk-taking in capital investment. 131 Various of these policies have been prominent at different times
and in different cases, and they do not all argue for1 32
the same type of
incentive structure or rest on equally strong grounds.
Of course, without a clearly defined policy underlying the capital
gain preference, formulation of case law doctrine to implement the policy
Popkin, The Deep Structureof CapitalGains, 33 CASE W. RES. 153, 154 (1983). The early legislative
history contains a passage that could be interpreted to advance any or all of the above three policies:
The sale of farms, mineral properties, and other capital assets is now seriously retarded
by the fact that gains and profits earned over a series of years are under the present law
taxed as a lump sum (and the amount of surtax greatly enhanced thereby) in the year in
which the profit is realized. Many such sales, with their possible profit taking and consequent increase of the tax revenue, have been blocked by this feature of the present tax
law.
H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., Ist Sess. 10-11 (1921).
130. See Brown, The Locked-In Problem, JOINT COMM. ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT, 84th
Cong., Ist Sess. PAPERS ON FEDERAL TAx POLICY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY 367
(1955); A.L.I., supranote 129, at 8-10, 183-87; Note, supra note 128 at 698-99; Note, supra note 128
at 103-05.
The following example illustrates the effect of "lock-in":
Assume that at the time of assets X's acquisition its estimated annual income production
was $10. Assuming a capitalization rate of 4 percent, its value at the time of acquisition
was $250. It can be assumed that X cost the taxpayer this amount. Next, assume that
immediately following the acquisition of X the estimated annual income production
therefrom increased to $12. Again using a 4 percent capitalization figure, X now has a
value of $300.
If it be assumed that the tax rate is 20 percent, the annual tax on an income flow of
$12 is $2.40. The present value of this future tax liability, using the 4 percent capitalization rate, is $60. The present after-tax value of X is $240 ($300 - $60). Of course, this
assumes indefinite deferral of any tax on gains is possible under the applicable system.
A switch from asset X to asset Y yielding precisely the same income as X would
result in the realization of $50 ($300 - $250) in gain. A tax of 20 percent on this gain
would amount to $10. The present after-tax value of Y to the taxpayer owner of X
contemplating a switch to Y must reflect this tax. Thus, Y's present after-tax value is
$300 (the present value of Y), reduced by the sum of $10 (the tax on the gain), and $60
(the present value of the future income tax liability). That is $300 - ($10 + $60) which
equals $230. Thus, the present after-tax value of Y is $230, which is less than the present
after-tax value of X by $10, the amount of the tax on the gain which would be incurred if
the taxpayer switched from X to Y.
Sneed, Capital Gains Taxation - American Plan, 1968 BRIT. TAX REv. 394, 395 n.5.
131. See Heller, Investors'Decisions,Equity, and the Capital Gains Tax, JOINT COMM. ON THE
EcoMoMIC REPORT, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., PAPERS ON FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR ECONOMIC
GROWTH AND STABILITY 381 (1955); A.L.I., supra note 129, at 11, 189-91; Note, supra note 128,
at 697-98; Note, supra note 128, at 105-107. For a history of the incentive and bunching justifications
for capital gains, see Popkin, supra note 129, at 155-61.
132. For example, a six-month holding period provides capital gains treatment where bunching
is not present, just as a preference granted to assets without regard to their rate of return may grant
relief where lock-in is not present.
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preference is likely to be unsatisfactory.1 33 This has indeed been the case,
in two respects. First, the capital gain common law has developed in the
shadow of an unsatisfactorily vague statute 134 and has come to emphasize components that are either technical and arbitrary, such as "property," ' 5 "sale or exchange," 136 "substitute for future ordinary
income," 13' 7 "fruit and tree," 138 or vague and subjective, such as the tax139
payer's motive or manner in holding the asset.
Thus already we have a triple layer of confusion: (1) uncertainty
over the merit of the preference; (2) uncertainty over the policy underlying the preference; and (3) uncertain and unsatisfactory judicial doctrine
to implement the preference. This triple confusion has led to case law
that is poorly reasoned, particularly in three areas: (1) the treatment of
contract termination payments and other transfers of unusual intangible
property;"4 (2) the disposition of real estate;141 and (3) the sale of assets
133. See generally Surrey, DefinitionalProblems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HARV. L. REv.
985 (1956).
[O~n the basis of exhaustive analysis of the authorities .... it is extremely difficult to
reconcile the treatment of certain contractual arrangements as giving rise to ordinary
income (i.e., the 'assignment of income' cases) with the common-law concept of property
rights, which supposedly underlie the capital gain definitional sections. The subcommittee was able to conclude that many of the problems in this vexing area of analysis are
settled judicially by virtue of the placement of given contract receipts in pigeon holes
which have traditionally come to connote either capital gain or ordinary income. The
subcommittee recognized that ultimate resolution of the problems in this area of taxation
can only be achieved when the purposes of the capital gains privilege itself are more fully
articulated by the Congress.
Annual Rep. of the Sec of Tax'n of the A.B.A., 1965 1 A.B.A. BULL. SEC. OF TAX'N 107-08.
134. Just as it can be assumed that certain income will remain ordinary despite a capital
gain policy, so it can be assumed that certain assets will, speaking generally, be given a
capital asset classification under a capital gain policy. Examples of such assets are corporate securities and land. But beyond these basic assets, representing the hard core of
capital gains policy, the existence of that policy creates difficult problems of classification. These problems relate directly to the formulation of a definition of capital gains
generally, for they involve the delineation of the borderline between capital gain and
ordinary income.
A.L.I., supranote 129, at 169. See also Del Cotto, "Property" in the CapitalAsset Definition:Influence of "Fruitand Tree," 15 BUFFALO L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1965).
135. See Del Cotto, supra note 134, at 53-59.
136. See, eg., Commissioner v. The Pittston Co., 252 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 357
U.S. 919 (1958); Commissioner v. Starr Bros. Inc., 204 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1953).
137. See, ag., Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 265-66 (1958), Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28, 31 (1941); United States v. Woolsey, 326 F.2d 287, 291 (5th Cir. 1963).
138. See Del Cotto, supra note 134, at 17-18.
139. See A.L.I., supra note 129, at 311-18, 347-55 (discussion of Corn Products issue); Surrey,
supra note 133, at 990-96.
140. In this area there has been significant confusion. See generally Chirelstein, CapitalGain on
the Sale of a Business Opportunity: The Income Tax Treatment of Contract Termination Payments,
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that are part of a regular business operation. 42 In each of these cases we
find unsatisfactory or unprincipled case law that is apparently produced
by the underlying uncertainty over the merits, policies, and doctrine of
the capital gains preference. Indeed, such confusion and complexity has
risen from the status of a mere effect of the preference to a basic argu49 MINN. L. Rav. 1 (1964); Del Cotto, supra note 134; Note, The PG. Lake Guides to Ordinary
Income: An Appraisalin Light of CapitalGain Policies, 14 STAN. L. REV. 551 (1962).
Based on older cases such as Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941) and Commissioner v.
P.G. Lake, 356 U.S. 260 (1958), a number of lower courts have held contract termination payments
to yield ordinary income. See Holt v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962); United States v.
Eidson, 310 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1962), rehrgdenied, modified, 312 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1963); BisbeeBaldwin v. Tomlinson, 320 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1963); Wiseman v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing
Co., 301 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1962), while another group of cases found capital gain in similar circumstances, see Nelson Weaver Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1962); United
States v. Dresser Indus. Inc. 324 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1963); Commissioner v. Goff, 212 F.2d 875 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 829 (1954); Ayrton Metals v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 741 (2d Cir.
1962); Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962).
In general, payments for disposition of other partial interests in intangible property had produced
confusion for some time. Compare Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941) (payment to lessor for
remainder df lease, ordinary income) and Spray Water Power and Land Co., 20 T.C.M. 353 (1961)
(lessor receives payment for remainder of lease, no sale or exchange) with Commissioner v. Ray, 210
F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 829 (1954) (same, lessee receives payment for remainder of lease, sale present) Walter H. Sutliff, 46 B.T.A. 446 (1942) (sale of remainder of lease by
lessor, capital gain) Commissioner v. Golonsky, 200 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
939 (1953) (cancellation of remainder of lease by lessee's "sale"); Commissioner v. McCue Bros. &
Drummond, Inc., 210 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1954) (same) and Metropolitan Bldg. Co., 31 T.C. 971
(1959), acq. 1959-2 C. B. 6, rev'd in part,Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. Commissioner, 282 F.2d 592 (9th
Cir. 1964).
Similar inconsistencies are found in carved out interest cases; compare Commissioner v. P.G.
Lake, 356 U.S. 260 (1958) with Ortiz Oil Co., 37 B.T.A. 656 (1938) (capital gain on oil payment, preLake) United States v. Foster, 324 F.2d 702 (1963) (dictum, risk must be taken into account in
determining capital gain status). Even the uncertainty of future return on the business opportunity
produced uncertain results, compare Wilkinson v. United States, 157 Ct. Cl. 847, 304 F.2d 469
(1962) (ordinary income) with Pacific Finance of California, 22 P.H. Tax C. M. 391 (1953) (capital
gain) and Pat O'Brien, 25 T.C. 376 (1955) (capital gain).
The treatment of the sale of employment, exclusive agency, or distribution contracts might turn
on the elusive existence of goodwill or whether an exclusive agency was involved, compare Thurlow
E. McFall, 34 B.T.A 108 (1936) (ordinary income) with George J. Aitkin, 35 T.C. 227 (1960) (capital gain) Elliot B. Smoak, 43 B.T.A. 907 (1941) (same), Jones v. Corbyn 186 F.2d 450 (10th Cir.
1950) (same).
Similar inconsistencies occurred in dispositions of a term of years in a lease, compare Burnet v.
Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932) (sale of term of years for lump sum payment, ordinary income) with
Bell's Estate v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1943) (sale of term of years cast as life estate,
capital gain) Estate of Johnson N. Camden, 47 B.T.A. 926 (1942), aff'd per curiam, 139 F.2d 697
(6th Cir. 1943) (same, even if seller holds a remainder).
141. See generally Bernstein, "Primarilyfor Sale" A Semantic Snare, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1093
(1968).
142. Chirelstein, supra note 140, at 1, 36-43; Note, The Unpleasant Taste of Corn Products,53 S.
CAL. L. REv. 311 (1979).
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ment against the preference itself.43
2. Specific Confusion: CarvingOut/Substitutesfor FutureOrdinary
Income. The preceding general discussion may suggest why capital
gains are confused and confusing. To understand the situation better, let
us take a closer look at one area of capital gains, that of "carved-out
interests" or "substitutes for future income."
Suppose a landlord owns a building which is leased to a tenant for
$100,000 per year on a lease with ten years to run. The market value of
the lease declines and the tenant offers the landlord the discounted premium value of $300,000 to get out of the lease. How should this amount
be treated? On the one hand, it is the sale of property, and not explicitly
excluded from the section 1221 definition of a capital asset. On the other
144
hand, the payment is merely a substitute for future rental payments.
Thus, the characterization issue of capital gain vs. ordinary income could
conceivably go either way. For practical reasons it is treated as ordinary
income to the lessor in order to avoid wholesale conversion of rental income into capital gain.145
The opposite situation is somewhat surprising. Assume rental values
increase, and the landlord offers the tenant $300,000 to release his right
to rent the premises for the next ten years at the below market rate. Logically one would think this payment to the tenant should also, on reasoning similar to the above case, be treated as ordinary income, in that this
was compensation for a savings in annual rents which would be reflected
in a higher income to the tenant from the leased premises. According to
case law, however, this is treated as the sale of a capital asset by the
lessee. 146 Thus we have two conceptual problems: (1) not only is it hard
to draw a bright line between property (capital gain) vs. mere substitute
for future income (ordinary income); but (2) the line drawn seems to
discriminate arbitrarily between the lessor and the lessee.
The conceptual resolution of these cases borrows from the fruit and
tree metaphor of the assignment of income cases.14 7 Whereas the lessee is
143. However, there are highly sophisticated and somewhat arcane proposals to implement a
"correct" capital gains preference to correct for lock-in. See Popkin, supranote 129; Note, A Spreading ofReceipts Formulafor Creatinga CapitalGains/OrdinaryIncome Brightline: Contract Termination Payments and Business-Versus-InvestmentAssets, 87 YALE L.J. 729 (1978).
144. Of course this point proves too much as the price of any capital asset is just the payment

for its income-generating potential in the future.
145.

For a discussion of this point see M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 287-302

(4th ed. 1985) and particularly 296-97.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 288; Del Cotto, supra note 134.
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selling everything he owns (the tree), the lessor is selling only an infi148
nitely repeatable subdivision of what he owns (the fruit).
Although this supplies a predictable answer, it hardly supplies a
principled answer, and up through the early 1960's there was a good deal
of confusion in courts and discussion in secondary literature 149 reflecting
that this solution was intellectually unsatisfying and at best only an arbitrary line drawn through the continuum from property right to income
right. As this merely practical rule of thumb compromise became accepted, most of the litigation and commentary stopped.
What does this ordinary/capital controversy have to do with
bailouts? The leasehold sale issue is essentially the same as an issue in
corporate/shareholder tax-the ordinary income treatment of a horizontal slice, the dividend receipt/income right-versus the capital gain treatment of a vertical slice-the sale of a share of stock. This discussion
demonstrates that this distinction is problematic not only in the corporate context, but also in the simpler underlying and analogous property
context, and concerns a basic income tax problem of distinguishing ordinary profit from appreciation in capital value.
B.

Corporate Conversion

The ordinary effect of an investment in corporate stock is to transform the undistributed operating profits of the corporation's business,
which would otherwise be ordinary income under a differently conducted
form of business, into a capital gain on the disposition of the stock. For
decades this has been an axiom of the taxation of corporations and shareholders. Yet it is an axiom about which the Code has always shown ambivalence. The existence of complex sections dealing with collapsible
corporations and accumulated earnings represents an acknowledgment
that there can be too much of a good thing. Once more, as we noticed in
the previous section on capital gains, we have an uncertainty and an ambivalence at the level of policy which translates into confusion at the level
of doctrine.
The Code shows a fundamental ambivalence about the conversion of
ordinary income into capital gain by use of the corporate form. It is for
this reason, presumably, that Robert Clark refers to the sale of corporate
148. Id. at 288, 297.
149. For a discussion of these issues and case law, see A.L.I., supra note 129; Chirelstein, supra
note 140; Del Cotto, supra note 134; Surrey, supra note 133; Note, supra note 128; Note, supra note

140.

1990]

SPIN-OFFS

stock to third parties as "the paradigm of a legitimate bailout."' 5 ° Note
the oxymoron of the phrase "legitimate bailout." The Code polices
against patterns of accumulating wealth in a corporation that may precede an eventual capital gains disposition when these patterns assume a
recognizable form of tax avoidance.
The collapsible corporation and accumulated earnings provisions
make the supererogatory nature of conversion even clearer. It is not to be
available to those who avail themselves of the corporate form excessively
and only to take advantage of conversion. Both sets of provisions are
notable for the subjectivity of their application. They apply to those who
have the aforementioned "bad purpose" as a subjective state of mind. 1 '
In short, these provisions suggest that the difference between permissible and ordinary conversion, and illicit bailout is a fuzzy and wavering line, informed particularly by notions of intent and vaguely defined
conventionality. This indicates the Code's fundamental ambivalence toward conversion, which compounds the aforementioned ambiguity toward capital gains itself.
An accurate analysis of conversion shows both that (1) it does not in
reality cause as much revenue loss as is often thought, and also (2) to the
extent theie is a revenue loss it is not due solely to the capital gains
preference.
With reference to the first point above, the tax savings by virtue of
corporate conversion may be illusory in many circumstances. Assume a
corporation, having a sole shareholder "S" with stock worth $1000,
earns $100 after tax during the year; assume further individual tax rates
of 50 percent on ordinary income and 20 percent on capital gains. This
$100 could be distributed to S, giving S after-tax proceeds of $50. Alternatively, the conventional view holds, S could sell the stock for $1100,
reaping $100 due to retained earnings, for an after-tax increment of $100,
taxed at 20 percent, leaving $80 after-tax. Thus corporate conversion
analysis would contrast the $50 retained by S on account of corporate
earnings after a distribution with the $80 so retained after a sale of stock.
150. See Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90, 11 (1977).
151. See I.RC. § 341(b)(1) ("the term 'collapsible corporation' means a corporation formed or
availed of principally for the manufacture of... property... with a view to (A) the sale or exchange
2
of stock by the shareholders... before the realization by the corporation.., of /3 of the taxable
income to be derived from such property, .... ")Id.; I.R.C. § 532(a) ("The accumulated earnings tax
...shall apply to every corporation... formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding the income
tax with respect to its shareholders..., by permitting earnings and profits to accumulate instead of
being divided or distributed.").
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Thus corporate conversion includes the premise that retaining $100
in earnings increases the value of the stock by $100. This is not true,
however, retaining $100 in earnings increases the stock value by only
$100(1-t), or $50, where "t" is the rate of tax on distributions. 1 2 Intuitively this is plausible because the purchaser of stock in an ongoing corporation must pay "t" dollars in tax in order to receive a distribution of
the $100 in earnings. Thus, after selling her stock for what is in reality
only $1050, S will have received only $50 on account of retained earnings, taxed at 20 percent, leaving $40 after tax, as opposed to the $50
retained after tax by S from earnings received in an ordinary distribution.
Thus, true conversion will occur only in a liquidation, in which S will
receive proceeds on account of retained earnings of $80 after tax.
With reference to the second point above, and using the same example, it was noted that in a liquidation, S would receive $80 on account of
retained earnings after imposition of a capital gains tax on the distribution of the $100, thus retaining more than the $50 she would retain after
tax in an ordinary distribution. This difference cannot be attributed to
the capital gains preference as clearly as it might appear to be. If corporate distributions to shareholders out of earnings and profits were taxed
at ordinary rates irrespective of whether they were liquidating or nonliquidating distributions, as logically they ought to be, the differential would
vanish. Thus, even that corporate conversion that appears in the preceding paragraph to occur only on a liquidation is due just as much to inconsistent implementation of the earnings and profits concept as it is to the
capital gains preference.
C. Dividends
I have stated above that the evil of the paradigm bailout case Gregory v. Helvering was not the receipt of the spun-off Averill stock but
rather its disposition by liquidation of Averill which put the appreciated
Monitor stock in Mrs. Gregory's hands directly, to be sold by her with
recognition of no further gain. 153 Insofar as section 355 treats the evil of
bailouts - disguised dividends - as the receipt of spun-off stock, it embodies an additional confusion. That is, it is in the nature of a dividend
that it is only a withdrawal of property from corporate solution, and to
the extent the anti-bailout rule of section 355 penalizes the receipt of
152. See Bradford, The Incidence andAllocation Effects of a Tax on CorporateDistributions, 15
J. PUB. ECON. 1, 12, 18 (1981).
153. See supra text accompanying note 119.
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corporate stock rather than .the disposition of corporate stock, it imposes
a penalty at the wrong point in time.
This position is usually rebutted by the observation that the receipt
of the spun-off stock was a valuable economic benefit-like a dividendin that it put Mrs. Gregory in a position from which she could easily
realize gain taxed at capital gains rates by liquidating the spun-off corporation. This rebuttal, however, rests on a confused syllogism, which apparently goes something like the following: "Because dividends are
valuable economic benefits to the shareholder and appropriate points at
which to impose an ordinary income tax, then valuable economic benefits
received by shareholders are like dividends and therefore appropriate
points to impose an ordinary income tax." However, an insightful article
has argued that a dividend is essentially a matter of form like much of
corporate/shareholder taxation, and that a dividend is and ought to be a
taxable event only as it removes property from corporate solution. 154 I
suggest that the justification for imposing an ordinary income tax on
Mrs. Gregory when she received the Averill stock rests on such a confusion between a dividend and a vaguely defined "economic benefit".
And yet, the suggestion that a dividend is only a matter of form
seems unsatisfying. As the preceding discussion of the capital/ordinary
treatment of carved out payments suggested, just as there is a difficult
problem of drawing an arbitrary line between various types of carved out
payments in general, and between the sale of stock (ordinary conversion/
154. See Kingson, The Deep Structure of Taxation: Dividend Distributions, 85 YALE L.J. 861
(1976). At this point three hypothetical situations present themselves for comparison. In case one,
the controlling corporation distributes to its shareholders a controlling portion of stock and its subsidiary; this was the situation in Gregory. The second situation is a variation on Gregory: assume that
United Mortgage Company had distributed the Monitor Securities Company stock to Mrs. Gregory
not in the form of the Averill corporation, but rather directly. The third situation is that of a small
mom and pop grocery store which distributes to its two shareholders General Motors stock. What
can be said about these three situations? The first one appears to be, assuming other requirements are
met, a legitimate spin-off. The second and third situations are essentially the same, and strike one as
essentially different from the first example. This suggests a limitation to my earlier suggestion that
the key element is whether or not assets are removed from corporate solution. In the second and
third examples, since only portfolio stock is distributed, it is true that assets are not being removed
from corporate solution, yet one has the feeling that this is much more like a taxable dividend than
the first example. What is the distinction that makes a difference? It is likely that in the first situation
the distributee shareholders are given a controlling amount of shares; and in the second and third
situations they are not. Therefore, as a modification to my earlier suggestion that the distribution of
stock is not an appropriate point for the imposition of a tax penalty, by disqualifying the spin-off, as
but the first step in a two-step transaction, I would modify this to say that this is the case only when
the distributee shareholders have the same controlling relationship to the distributed stock as they
have to the stock of the distributing corporation. The Code has frequently treated a controlling stock
ownership specially in such instances as look-through rules, consolidation, attribution, etc.
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"legitimate bailout") and the illicit bailout in the conversion context, so
too, there is a difficult line to be drawn between those corporate distributions giving rise to ordinary income and to capital gain. Separation from
corporate solution may not be enough of a distinction, if it is remembered
that for a long time distributions in partial liquidation also gave rise to
capital gain to the transferee shareholders.
There is one argument against my assertion that it is inappropriate
to disqualify a tax free spin-off when the stock is distributed irrespective
of whether or not there is an actual or contemplated consequence of selling or liquidating. That is to say, that when a business that is fed by
profits of a primary business is distributed, in a subsidiary, to shareholders, earnings and profits have in effect already been distributed. There are
two counterarguments to this point. First of all, it does not suggest a
way to determine at which point earnings and profits have really been
distributed. This is the same sort of fuzzy line-drawing implicit in alternate formulations of the proper focus of section 355, namely bailout versus no bailout, business purpose versus tax purpose, or public versus
private company. The second problem with the argument is that it suggests that the test, properly construed, for a tax free spin-off ought to be
the absence of the distribution of earnings and profits. This, however,
cannot be the case; clearly, in a successful tax free spin-off earnings and
profits are distributed, in the form of a subsidiary fed by earnings of the
primary business of the distributing corporation. This leads one necessarily to look elsewhere than whether earnings and profits have "been distributed" to find the proper test for whether the spin-off ought to be tax
free, which leads one back to the confusing requirements of bailout versus non-bailout, or the equally problematic statutory requirements of
business purpose, five year active trade or business, and no device. Thus,
at three different levels of doctrine underlying bailouts- capital gain in
general, conversion in general, and dividends in general-there is a similar arbitrary line-drawing problem.
D. Reorganizations
There is a line-drawing problem in reorganizations as well. The regulations state:
Tax-free (more accurately tax-deferred) reorganizations, as well as distributions under section 355, are normally justified to provide nonrecognition treatment only to distributions that are incident to readjustments of
corporate structures required by business exigencies and that effect only

1990]

SPIN-OFFS

readjustments
of continuing interests in property under modified corporate
15 5
forms.

The theory is apparently that only the form, and not the nature, of
the shareholder's investment is changed.156 This is presumably the source
of the requirement (applicable to reorganizations and by judicial extension to section 355 distributions) for continuity of interest and of business
enterprise.157 The fact of the matter is, however, that the precise policy
rationale for tax-free reorganizations has never been articulated in clear
or convincing terms and the reorganization provisions make some sense
as a more or less unprincipled incentive to business.158 The propriety of
tax-free shareholder treatment and corporate carryover basis in acquisitive reorganizations appears to have been more assumed than thought
59
out under recent ambitious studies of corporate tax reform.'
The provisions might make sense by analogy to section 1031 if
shareholders were merely changing the form of their investment rather
than the nature of the tangible and intangible assets in their corporate
portfolio. 160 It is on this theory presumably that "stock swapping" in the
tax-free incorporation of corporations is prohibited.' 6 1 Under this doctrine, a tax-free acquisition or division ought to be permitted only where
the nature of the portfolio of assets remains essentially the same. By definition this is only sometimes true in corporate divisions, and it is also the
exception in acquisitive reorganizations.' 62
There is a plausible justification for reorganizations that does however implicate the same sort of arbitrary line-drawing problem we have
encountered in capital gains, conversion, and dividends. On the one
hand, it may be economically efficient to combine business enterprises,
and to allow this to be done by tax-free reorganizations is to recognize
155. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b) (1989).
156. See Clark, supra note 150, at 117.
157. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.368-1 (1980); 1.355-2(b)(c) (1989).
158. See Sandberg, The Income Tax Subsidy to "Reorganizations", 38 COLUM. L. REv. 98

(1938). This is an acceptable justification in a sense, but it does make the accompanying search for
the distinction between a "true reorganization" and a "sale" somewhat pointless.
159. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, THE SUBCHAPTER C REVISION ACT OF 1985,
S. Rpt. 47, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); A.L.I., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER C,
PROPOSALS ON CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND DISPOSITIONS

(1982).

160. See Note, Reorganization Policies and Provisions:A Need for Clarificationand Change, 14
STAN. L. REV. 848, 849 (1962).
161. See Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c) (1967). It is not clear why tax-deferred diversification of investment is permitted when tangible assets are transferred to a corporation on its formation by shareholders, but not by stock swapping.
162. See Note, Reorganization Policies and Provisions:A Need for Clarificationand Change, 14
STAN. L. REV. 848, 852 (1962).
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that tax impediments should not be put in the way of efficiency. 6 On the
other hand, when a small grocery store is absorbed by Safeway in a "C"
reorganization, there is little doubt that the small taxpayers have cashed
out their investment, which may be a countervailing argument for imposing a shareholder level tax. At what point does one view of the exchange
trump the other?
A parallel argument can be made with respect to divisive reorgani1
zations. Efficiency or other business objectives may justify separation, 6
but at what point is the countervailing policy of taxing a distribution to
apply?
In conclusion, then, the last conceptual underpinning of tax-free
separations is as vague as the preceding three. This results in a provision,
section 355, whose policy is conceptually indeterminate. It is this, rather
than the superficial concentration on rigid and technical requirements of
section 355 which has been the focus of most commentators, that should
be the starting point of analysis of how section 355 came to the curious
results suggested above.
E.

What Is a Bailout?

In short, it is conceptual poverty and confusion over the purpose
section 355 is supposed to accomplish, and the evil (bailout) it is supposed to prevent that must be the starting point of analysis.
As claimed above, the real source of section 355's complexity is its
indetermination by the four policies, capital gain, conversion, dividends,
and reorganizations. How do these relate to the three important requirements of section 355 mentioned in Part III and to the troublesome applications in Part V above?
The confusion over capital gains and conversion has led Congress to
draw an arbitrary line between the legitimate bailout, the sale of a share
of stock, and Ms. Gregory's case. That is, bailouts are permissible so long
as one waits five years to effectuate them. 165 This logic led to the suggestion of a taint on stock, but in section 355's present form it is translated
into a taint on the spun-off business.
163. However, this principle has, and must have, limits. The principle that one should not penalize efficient transactions by imposing a current tax on them, is problematic; this argument would
of course object to even a taint imposed on distributed stock. It is clear that we do not always hold
that efficient transactions should be either tax-free or tax benefited, or in that case, stock sales would
not have a current tax imposed on them.
164. But perhaps not necessarily a § 355 distribution, see infra text accompanying notes 188-93.
165. Should Mrs. Gregory's spin-off have been tax-free had she waited five years to liquidate
Averill and sell the Monitor stock?
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The most notable sign of this confusion is the "device test". It is
helpful to the extent that it leads to a focus on post-distribution sales,
which is the essence of the bailout, but this is more directly achieved by
the stock taint or stapling. To the extent the vagueness of the device test
includes other factors, such as post-distribution dealings between the
controlling and the controlled corporations, the test does not seem tied to
any particularly identifiable notion of a bailout.
The insistence on business purpose, while its lineage is the Gregory
decision, stems in fact from the real uncertainty over exactly what the
purpose and policy of reorganizations are. Ultimately, Congress knows
they must have something to do with "business". Since this business purpose requirement is dubious in its lineage and vague in its meaning and
application, it is unhelpful. 66 To the extent it is meant to filter out transactions with a primary or significant tax-avoidance purpose, a specific
and objective means such as the stock tainting or stock stapling is
preferable.
The insistence on activity relates directly to another ambivalence
about capital gains conversion as reflected in the personal holding company ("PHC") and other provisions discussed above. Indeed, one proposal for section 355 would have prevented spin-offs of companies with ten
percent of PHC income. While conversion is felt to be tolerable, where it
results from passive investment it is disfavored. The possibility of selling
the spun off stock relates to this in two ways: (1) passive investments are
thought to be more easily sold,16 7 (2) the approach of section 355 is prophylactic. 168 Sales of distributed stock are not discouraged by the device
requirement only, but also by the insistence that the distributed stock be
a less salable active business. Finally, the prophylactic approach of § 355
shows itself by imposing the penalty earlier than necessary; that is, on the
receipt of the stock rather than on its disposition. 169 However, if the insistence on activity is meant to discourage early disposition (by sale or
166. An objection could be made to this description: it might be argued that Congress will
provide nonrecognition only when there are substantial productivity or efficiency gains from so doing, and unless there is a business purpose such gains are unlikely. That defense of the business
purpose requirement is still open to the objection that it is difficult to apply and probably unnecessary if the stock stapling reform suggested below were to be adopted.
167. See supra discussion at text accompanying note 114-115 (liquidity and purchase of a going

business).
168. Compare Whitman's use of the term "cordon sanitaire," see supra note 58.
169. This timing is also inappropriate from a liquidity point of view as the distribution of stock
does not leave the taxpayer with any funds to pay the tax.
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liquidation/sale) after the distribution, a stock taint or stapling approach
is much more focused and effective.
To the extent the activity test represents a dislike of passive corporations, 170 as discussed above in my treatment of the Code's ambivalence
toward conversion, there should be no more objection to the separate
existence of passive assets in a separate spun-off or controlling corporation (so long as the specific rules of accumulated earnings, personal holding company, and collapsibility are not involved) than there is to the
same assets present in the undivided corporation.17 1 In this sense, the
disfavoring of spinning off passive assets represents either nothing more
than an unprincipled extension of the Code's general dislike of holding
passive assets in a corporation with the possibility of conversion, without
being justified as falling within one of the specific legislative prohibitions,
or a historical confusion.'7 2 Thus the insistence on activity, to the extent
it is unrelated to the danger of a subsequent disposition, is just a sloppy
extension of the Code's already amorphous ambivalence about conversion through doing business in a corporation.
What accounts for this prophylactic approach; this extreme wariness? It is the ambiguity over the third policy, that of dividends. Because
there is confusion over whether the taxable event ought to be the distribution of stock or the realization of its value in dollars, there is a tendency to believe that the dividend distribution has already occurred with
point, the converthe distribution of the stock, rather than at its logical
73
solution.1
corporate
from
removal
sion to cash or
Another way of looking at my emphasis on the step transaction
characterization of the bailout is to say that the premise of this paper is
that section 355 is wrong in imposing the taxability test at the distribution of stock rather than the realization (by liquidation or sale) of earnings and profits. This mistaken emphasis is thus an impediment to
legitimate spin-offs.
Thus, it is the prophylactic caution, resulting from confusion over
what is a dividend, that leads to the cumbersome result of tainting the
170. See supra text accompanying notes 111-116.
171. As long as the passive assets are not sold, which is taken care ofby the proposed stock taint
or stapling.
172. See supra note 115.
173. It may be argued that in a closely held corporation, the multiplication of pieces of paper
representing interests in corporate operations is itself an evil. Is there a close relation between the
number of pieces of paper representing interests in assets and the value of assets? This may be the
case if, as in the case of a closely held corporation, disposal of the stock by a few controlling shareholders might be similar in effect to a direct disposal of an asset by the corporation.
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about-to-be spun-off business rather than the distributed stock. This is
cumbersome because it is always more ambiguous and complex to identify an entity as a new business, for purposes of tainting, than it is to
identify a share of stock for that purpose. It is dubious for another reason. As the discussions of Lockwood, Burke, Boettger and Nielsen, Example 7, and the Revenue Ruling 59-400174 above are meant to imply, it is
quite normal for a profitable business to expand its operations by investing in the same or a different line of operations. It is difficult to see why
the choice of type of business, and manner of investment/expansion by
which the profitable corporation invests, should bear on whether a later
spin-off of the expanded portion of the business represents tax-avoidance
or not.1 75 Therefore, the separations in Lockwood, Burke, Boettger and
Nielsen, Example 7, and the Revenue Ruling 59-400 should all stand or

fall together. 176
VII.
A.

PROPOSED REFORMS-STOCK TAINT OR STAPLING

Reasons for Reforms

As the discussion so far has shown, there are two reasons for reform. First, the three major requirements of section 355- business purpose, five-year active conduct of a trade or business, and no device-are
unsatisfactory. Business purpose remains undefined. Five-year active
conduct is difficult to administer as it requires identifying new and old
businesses, which is artificial, and it contains questionable distinctions
between expansion from without and from within. "Device" is potentially useful, but it is confused in that like the other two requirements, it
174. See supra text accompanying notes 62-95.
175. As always, with the caveat of a subsequent disposition of the spun-off stock being borne in
mind.
176. A way that these cases can be treated consistently is by use of the taint or stapling approaches suggested in Part VII, below.
At first glance one might infer that the lack of recent case law on § 355 indicates that the section
works perfectly well; in one sense at least, this is clearly not true, however. It is almost certain, for
example, that many desirable transactions which would flunk the five year active business purpose
test result in no rulings being applied for, and no transactions that would give rise to case law even
being attempted, and the absence of case law or private letter ruling precedent in such circumstances
is definitely not an indication that § 355 works adequately as presently drafted.
One purpose I have not considered above in criticizing § 355's imposition of a penalty on distribution instead of on realization is that it is justified as a backstop for the accumulated earnings tax.
Here again, though, there is a problem of fit between evil and remedy. The remedy is underinclusive
in that it does not apply to accumulated earnings invested in a secondary business if that business is
not separated. It is overinclusive in that, as in the case of Boettger, it penalizes distributions where
there is no intent to avoid a shareholder level dividend tax.
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may unnecessarily disqualify plans that are not bailouts, but which only
make bailouts possible.
In short, all three of the major requirements embody the excessively
anxious prophylactic approach mentioned above.1 77 They fail to recognize that the evil of a bailout is essentially a step transaction, and the
only legitimate function of section 355 should be the prevention of the
second step, sale or liquidation.
B. ProposedReform
If tax free spin-offs are justified, and if the evil they must not engender is bailouts, the logical route would have been to taint the stock for a
limited period. The period should be limited because it is the essence of a
bailout to be a step transaction and not conversion per se, but too-rapid
conversion. Any disposition of the stock within a five-year period, the
current tainting period for the business, should lead to ordinary income.17 1 This approach has been raised several times, 179 and the only
unfairness it might cause relates to sales to remedy shareholder disputes,
and to give key employees a stock interest, which is dealt with below.1 0
A stock taint is a superior anti-bailout measure as it is more focused than
the present three requirements of no device, business purpose, and fiveyear active business.
In practice, this could be accomplished by repeal of sections 355
(a)(1)(B) (device test), 355(a)(1)(C) (reference to active business test),
355(a)(3)(B) (stock recently acquired is boot), and 355(b) (five year active
business test), and section 1.355-2(b) of the regulations (business purpose), and those other portions of the regulations pertaining to device
177. See supra text accompanying notes 166-76.
178. There is one striking hypothetical which can be used as an argument against the premise
that a stock taint is a sufficient remedy. Assume there is a business with large amounts of cash and
every year some cash is spun-off into some small corporation that is distributed to the shareholders.
After five such annual distributions, it would, under the stock taint approach, be possible for the
shareholders to sell their stock in one corporation per year, thus permitting the equivalent of an
annual cash dividend after only a five year wait. This hypothetical may be the strongest argument for
substituting the permanent stapling proposal in lieu of the taint.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 51-54 (Senator Humphrey's proposal); H.R. REP. No.
1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A121; Brown, An Approach to Subchapter C, in 3 TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 1619, 1624-25 (House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1959) (Comm. Print 1959); Cohen, Reconciling Business Purpose with Bail-out Prevention:
Federal Tax Policy and Corporate Divisions, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1077, 1089-1094 (1976); Whitman,
supra note 37, at 1206-1207 (discussing H.R. REP. No. 8300).
180. See infra text accompanying notes 192-94.
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and five-year active business (Treasury Regulations Sections 1.355-2(d)
and 1.355-3). In their place would be a new section 355(b):
If any stock or securities distributed pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) of
this section are disposed of within five years other than in a nontaxable
reorganization, whether by sale, liquidation, pledge, or otherwise, the
amount realized shall be treated as ordinary income.381
The question arises whether a taint is practically administrable. It
may appear at first blush that it is more easy to administer a stock taint
in a closely held corporation as opposed to a public corporation. Even in
the latter case, it is possible that a stock certificate distributed to a shareholder could be accompanied by a form, similar to a W-2 form, which
would be required to be affixed to the taxpayer's return notifying the
Sevice that the stock is tainted.
There is a more sophisticated strategy than a simple taint. Instead of
a taint the Treasury could require, as a condition to tax free spin-offs,
that the controlled corporation's stock be stapled to the controlling corporation stock, either for a period of five years or permanently. 182 This
would mean that the distributee shareholders would not be able to sell or
liquidate the controlled corporations' stock without selling a proportionate share of the controlling corporation's stock within a period of six
months. This added provision should satisfy the objections of those who
believe that a taint is not a sufficient restriction. If the stapling requirement were permanent, the efficiency goals of tax-free spin-offs would be
met without the possibility of delayed bailouts. The distributee shareholders would receive stock that could not be sold without a sale of a
proportionate share of the controlling/distributing corporation stock.
Therefore, in essence, there would be no possibility of an indirect sale of
only a portion of the corporation's assets, thus realizing distributed earnings and profits. On the other hand, it would permit separate markets for
the sale of the two corporation's stock to different purchasers, thus allowing the efficiency gain of separate ownership of the two corporations
183
with the concomitant rise in stock values as hypothesized below.
What about other reformulations of the anti-bailout test of section
355? It was suggested earlier that either an actual or desirable way to
reconcile and simplify the various requirements of section 355 is simply
181. This should include transfers to corporations and partnerships pursuant to §§ 351 and 721
of the Code but not include sales of the controlled corporation's stock together with a proportional
amount of the controlling corporation's stock.
182. See I.R.C. § 269B(c) for a suitable definition of "stapled."
183. See infra text accompanying notes 195-96.
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to say that where there is a valid business purpose to the distribution and
separation, the transaction should be tax-free.184 This however, is open to
the substantial objection that such a test would be entirely too subjective
and speculative. Perhaps a substitute or proxy for this test is the distinction between public corporations and private corporations. The argument would be that it is more likely that there are non-tax reasons for a
distribution and separation of a public company than in a private company, because the greater number of shareholders in a public company
makes it less likely that an asset can be indirectly disposed of by shareholders without the corporate tax on the direct distribution of the asset
by the shareholders. As suggested below, the business purpose in a public
company spin-off might be to enhance the combined value of the stock of
the controlled and controlling corporation as compared to the value of
operations in a single corporation, rather than to divide assets among
shareholders. 185
Nevertheless, the distinction between a public company and a private company is neither intuitively clear nor easy to draw. There is the
difficulty of determining the appropriate number of shareholders at
which to make the distinction, just as there is in distinguishing between
bailout versus non-bailout, or business purpose versus tax avoidance
purpose.
On the other hand, the suggestion that in public companies spin-offs
are not taken for tax avoidance purposes may not bear close scrutiny. As
the later discussion of mirror transactions suggests, mirror transactions
and spin-offs may be used for similar purposes to dispose of corporate
assets. If it is possible for shareholders en masse to sell, after a suitable
wait, the distributing company's stock in a tender offer to an interested
purchasing corporation, the ultimate effect is the same as if the distributing corporation had sold an asset, only without the recognition of corporate level gain. It is clearly in the interest of the shareholders to
accomplish the disposition of a portion of a corporation's assets this way,
because they benefit from the lack of corporate level gain. There is no
reason to suppose that spin-offs are not used in this way.
An alternative way to distinguish between a legitimate spin-off and
an impermissible bailout would be a size test. According to such a test, a
spin-off would be permissible so long as it was greater than a given proportion of the corporation's aggregate assets. This would help to distinguish between a distribution which in its size and effect was equivalent to
184.
185.

See supra text accompanying note 106-08 and note 100.
See infra text accompanying notes 195-96.
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the proportion of assets normally paid out by the corporation as dividends and a more substantial distribution that was a legitimate spin-off.

VIII. POST-ACT TRANSACTIONS
A.

Section 355 and the Repeal of the Capital Gains Preference: Cured
Problemsand New Problems

186
On the simplest analysis, the repeal of the capital gains preference
renders the prophylactic purpose of section 355 to prevent bailouts irrelevant. This would suggest elimination of the no device, business purpose,
and five-year active business sections proposed above without the addition of the taint or stapling rules in my proposed section 355(b). My
second proposed reform would be radical simplification of section 355
amounting to, as in the previous suggested reform, repeal of section 355
(a)(1)(B) (device test), section 355(a)(1)(C) (reference to active business
test), section 355(a)(3)(B) (stock recently acquired is boot), and section
355(b) (five-year active business test), and section 1.355-2(b) of the regulations (business purpose), and those other portions of the regulations
pertaining to device and five-year active business (Treas. Reg. Sections
1.355-2(d) and 1.355-3), but without the addition of a stock taint or
stapling.
For reasons we shall explore below, spin-offs are becoming more
popular and important recently,18 7 and this may be the cause of additional pressure to facilitate them by repeal of the sections suggested
above. However, as the following sections B through D will suggest, the
bailout danger formerly associated with section 355 has been replaced by
different problematic aspects. One important reason for reevaluating section 355 currently, in addition to the already valid reason suggested in
the earlier part of this paper for reevaluating device 355, is that "device
for the distribution of earnings and profits" is not helpful as a backstop to
the repeal of General Utilities-appropriateas that test might have been
to a regime concerned primarily with the distinction between capital
gains and ordinary income.
Before we consider these newer possible drawbacks to section 355, it
is appropriate to evaluate the advantages of spin-offs. The conventional
thinking is that they make possible the division of a corporation for sev186. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 301, (effective for tax years beginning after
December 31, 1986).
187. See Wolfman, Subchapter Cand the 100th Congress, 31 TAX NoTEs, 669, 671 (1986); See
infra text accompanying notes 197-209.
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eral valid business reasons, such as complying with regulatory decrees,

resolving shareholder disputes, and allowing the purchase of part of a
business by a key employee.'18 In the case of spin-offs, however, one author has argued that nearly all of the legitimate objectives may be accomplished without the distribution of stock to shareholders." 9
For example, one typical justification for a spin-off is to allow a key

employee to share in profits and ownership. Assume one corporation
owns two stores and it is desired to give the manager of each an interest
in his respective store. This could be accomplished by spinning-off two
corporations, one owning each store, to the original shareholder who
would then sell shares in each to the key employees. The same goal can,
however, be accomplished without a distribution. 190
188. According to Cohen, the following are representative legitimate business needs advanced in
favor of corporate divisions:
segregation of hazardous activities in a separate corporation, separation of a business to
permit its employees to share in profits or ownership, disposition of unwanted assets in
connection with a merger, compliance with demands of a customer when a corporation
produces items under its own label, in competition with each other, compliance with
preconditions and settlement of a shareholder dispute by giving each shareholder ownership of one business.
See Cohen, ReconcilingBusiness Purpose with Bail-out Prevention:Federal Tax Policy and Corporate
Divisions, 28 STAN. L. REv. 1077, 1100 (1976). According to Helfand and Lafving:
"Under the present regulations, there are many cases and rulings determining the
sufficiency of a particular business purpose. Such purposes include solving labor-related
problems, facilitating a merger, settling stockholder disputes, and strengthening the corporation's competitive position."
Helfand & Lafving, supra note 117, at 59 (footnotes omitted). Whitman discusses a few of these
reasons as well. See Whitman, supra note 37, at 1254.
189. See Cohen, supra note 188, at 1102.
190.
b. Separation of a business to permit its employees to share in profits and ownership.
Suppose that A owns all the stock of A Corp., a retail clothing business with two stores
(Store A and Store B) and that A wishes to sell the manager of each store an equity
interest in the company, limited to the store that manager supervises. Therefore, A is
unwilling to sell stock in A Corp., since A stock includes an interest in the success of
both stores. However, A Corp. could effect a division by transferring Store B to B Corp.
and distributing the B stock. The original owner, A, could then sell A shares to the
manager of Store A and B shares to the manager of Store B. The division permits A to
sell each manager an interest limited to the store he manages. [An alternative to this
would be special classes of "alphabet stock," the earnings of which would be tied to the
performance of each store.]
However, consider the following alternative that obviates the need for a division. A
Corp. could form two separate subsidiaries, B Corp. and C Corp. A Corp. becomes, in
effect, a holding company for two separate subsidiaries, each of which owns one store.
The final step is for A Corp. to sell C shares to Store A's manager and B shares to B's
manager [which would presumably cause tax liability for A Corp., a further disadvantage.].
The mere creation of parent-subsidiary relations, without more, achieves the business
purpose without creating bail-out potential. But does this technique possess any serious
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Another justification for a spin-off is to dispose of unwanted assets
in preparation for a merger. Again, a distribution1 91 of stock of the controlled corporation is unnecessary once the assets have been placed in
separate shells.

192

One case where a distribution is necessary is that of the quarreling
shareholders, where it is decided that each shareholder will take part of
the combined corporation and go his separate way. 193 As this will constitute a split-off or a split-up rather than a spin-off, it is beyond the scope
of this paper for the most part. However, it should be noted that this
disadvantages relative to the division? The corporate holding company pattern appears
more complex than a clean division of ownership interest at the shareholder level. But,
as a logical matter, whether the majority owner, A, owns each of the operating corporations directly or through a holding company should not affect the rights and responsibilities of A ps dominant owner. State corporation statutes should not impose different
duties depending on the formal pattern of A's ownership.
Cohen, supra note 188, at 1102.
191. For the difficulty of requiring a separate business purpose for the separation and the distribution, see Whitman, supra note 37, at 1241-42, highlighted in what might be called pre-merger
spin-off cases such as Commissioner v. Morris Trust, 367 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1966), In these cases a
group of corporate operations which is unwanted by an acquiring corporation and thus an impediment to a potential merger is spun-off to the target corporation's shareholders and then the distributing corporation is merged with the acquiring corporation. It might be asked in such cases what is the
business purpose for the non-taxable spin-off, since the same result could be accomplished by a
taxable distribution of the unwanted business. Yet this argument would prove too much, in that it
would undercut the entire premise of spin-offs since it is always possible to accomplish the same
results as a spin-off by a taxable distribution.
192.
c. Disposition of unwanted assets in connection with a merger. Suppose that K
Corp. owns a crayon business and a warehouse. L Corp. wishes to acquire the crayon
business, but not the warehouse. To pave the way for a merger of the crayon business, K
Corp. transfers the warehouse to M Corp. and distributes the M stock. The unwanted
warehouse has been eliminated through a division so that K Corp. and L Corp. may be
merged. However a division is not necessary to achieve K's business purpose. Instead, K
Corp. could create two subsidiaries, transferring the crayon business to one and the
warehouse to the other. The crayon subsidiary and L Corp. may still be merged without
the unwanted warehouse.
Cohen, supra note 188, at 1102-03 (footnote omitted).
193.
3. Substantiallydisproportionatedivision. Suppose that Q and R, each owning onehalf of QR Corp., have decided to separate, dividing between them their interests in the
corporate business. QR Corp. transfers one-half its assets to a subsidiary and distributes
the stock in redemption of R's entire interest in QR Corp. The result is complete separation of Q's and R's interests. Whereas before each owned one-half of QR Corp. each now
owns 100 percent of a corporation with one-half of the assets that had been jointly
owned. Obviously, to separate ownership of assets at the corporate level by merely creating a subsidiary will not (without more) suffice to achieve the business purpose. In addition, the subsidiary stock must be distributed in order to separate and realign
shareholder interests. Therefore, this presents the one case where tax-free treatment unquestionably should be allowed.
Id. at 1104 (footnote omitted).
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transaction, being analogous to a disproportionate redemption, contains
no danger of shareholder level tax avoidance and so should probably be
allowed without regard to the requirements of section 355 such as active
194
business, etc.
The preceding analysis, denigrating the need for the distribution
component of spin-offs, may be too simple, abstract, or incomplete. This
analysis fails to consider that there may be various inevitable reasons for
the separation of ownership that could not be accomplished by a holding
company structure, such as an antitrust decree. There are various other
reasons why a complete separation of ownership between the controlling
and the controlled corporations may be practically necessary, including
the insistence of key employees who want to purchase stock, lower insurance or credit costs, state law provisions, the insistence of customers/
competitors, and the desire to have a separate market for shares in each
corporation. 195 There is also the potential problem of loss of control and
deconsolidation if the controlling corporation sells more than twenty percent of the subsidiary's stock, as well as undesirable gain to the holding
company, when it sells stock in a subsidiary to a new shareholder.
One possible business purpose for not only the separation of corporations, but for a distribution of the controlled corporation's stock, is to
enhance the value of the distributing and distributed corporations' stock.
It is possible, for example, that two businesses may be incompatible, such
as an insurance company and a gambling operation. Investors preferring
a high return with a high amount of risk may feel the earnings of the
gambling operation are diluted by inclusion of the insurance company
operations, and similarly, investors preferring a lower return with a
lower amount of risk may pay a higher price for the insurance company's
stock unaffected by the vagaries of the gambling operation. In such a case
the stock of a corporation comprising gambling and insurance operations
194.

See supra text accompanying notes 77-87 (discussion of Boetiger and Nielsen, both split-up

cases).
195. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-27-050 (April 7, 1987) (insurance costs); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-11-015
(Dec. 10, 1986) (same); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-16-049 (Jan. 16, 1987) (same); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-22-053
(Mar. 2, 1987) (professional law corporation can only be owned by lawyers under state law); Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 87-22-039 (Feb. 27, 1987) (same re physicians); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-24-021 (Mar. 13, 1987)
(insistence of competitors/customers); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-10-057 (Jan. 8, 1986) (same); Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 87-13-069 (Dec. 31, 1986) (credit); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-10-056 (Dec. 8, 1986) (same); Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 87-12-058 (Dec. 23, 1986) (employees object to dividend received deduction of corporate shareholder of subsidiary in which they wish to buy stock); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-11-019 (Dec. 10, 1986)
(same); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-130-51 (Dec. 30, 1986) (out-of-state profits apportioned by state law to
corporation controlled by a common parent); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-020-75 (Aug. 28, 1986) (market can
better evaluate the value of separately owned corporations).
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may sell for $100, whereas each share of stock in the separated companies may sell for an amount higher than $50, assuming that the values of
196
the operations are equal.
Thus, we have a peculiar situation of spin-offs hanging midway in
balance. With the abolition of capital gains, the old danger in spin-offs
has disappeared, but there may be less need for spin-offs than commonly
thought. The final evaluation of whether spin-offs should be retained, and
in what form, depends on the evaluation of their role in a post-1986
world. As we shall see, the role of spin-offs in the new world consists
primarily of enabling corporations to sell assets selectively and indirectly
through the sale of stock of subsidiaries and without the recognition of
corporate level gain. The following section will evaluate that role.
B. Section 355, Spin-Offs, Mirror Transactions and the Selective Sale
of Assets by Selling Stock in Subsidiaries
Start with this assumption about the real world: corporate sellers
prefer to sell stock and corporate buyers prefer to buy assets. 197 Often,
both before and after 1986, this resulted in a sale taking the form of a
stock sale. Assume further that the seller, Target ("T"), has two divisions
("DI" and "D2"), the first of which (Dl) Buyer ("B") wants and the
second of which B does not want. Before 1986, B could buy the stock of
T, make a section 338 election and obtain a stepped up basis in the assets
of T while recognizing no gain under old section 337.198 At that point, B
could sell the assets of the unwanted business (D2) without recognizing
gain.
The sale by B of such unwanted assets from T can no longer be
accomplished so easily in a post-1986 world. To obtain a stepped-up inside basis in the unwanted D2 portion of T's assets, B will have to recognize gain as old section 337 has been repealed. Similarly, B would
recognize gain in the amount of the difference between the low inside
bases of the unwanted T assets and their fair market value if B were to
sell the assets directly without a step-up in basis.
The question now is, given the insistence by T on selling both D1
196. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-020-75 (Aug. 28, 1986) (for an example of this).
197. Reasons for this preference are simplicity and the avoidance of recapture, and inside/
outside basis difference from buyer's point of view.
198. Under old § 337, which was previously the operative provision in a § 338 election, a corporation would generally not recognize gain on the sale of appreciated assets to a third party, with
certain exceptions such as recapture, if made within a limited period of and pursuant to the adoption
of a plan of liquidation.
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and D2 in a stock sale to B, and B's desire to acquire only part of T's
assets (DI), how can this be accomplished without B recognizing gain,
which B is unwilling to do because it has paid full market value for the
assets already in the stock price, albeit that the assets retain their low
inside basis?1 99 The answer is either a foresightful spin-off before the sale,
or a mirror transaction after the sale.
1. Spin-Offs and the Selective Sale of Assets by Selling Stock If T
has at some suitable time earlier placed the wanted assets in a subsidiary
and spun it off, B has no problem as it simply buys the stock of the
subsidiary. This satisfies T's desire to sell stock only and B's desire to
acquire only part of T's assets. In a sense, the spin-off has become a way
around the repeal of General Utilitiesbecause it avoids the need for B to
buy all of T's assets and recognize a corporate level gain on selling the
unwanted assets. For this reason, spin-offs are becoming more popular.2" What, though, if B has not had the foresight or, given the present
rigors of section 355, the ability to spin-off the desirable assets of DI? In
that case B must buy all of T's stock and do a mirror transaction.
2. Mirror Transactions. Although they sound mysterious and
complex, mirror transactions are fairly simple and are illustrated by the
accompanying chart which is explained below.20 1
The following account describes a mirror transaction before it was
precluded by the 1987 amendment to subsection 337(d).20 2 Buyer has 180
in cash, and T has assets in two divisions, D l and D2. The assets in each
division have a value of $90 and an inside basis of $30. In order to acquire only the desired assets of D1, B goes through the following steps. It
forms subsidiaries S I and S2 by a contribution of capital of $90 to each in
199. It could of course be argued that a buyer would not rationally pay full (pre-tax) fair market
value for assets that would have a lower value to him because of the necessity of paying a tax toll

charge to obtain the assets. See supra text accompanying notes 151-53 for a similar point.
200. See Wolfman, Subchapter C and the 100th Congress, 33 TAX NoTEs 669, 671 (1986).
201. For a discussion of the mirror transaction, see Kliegman, Do Mirror TransactionsSurvive
the 1986 Act?, 66 J. TAX'N 206 (April 1987); Sheppard, Mirror Moves: Life Without The General
Utilities Rule, 32 TAX NOTs 847 (1986); Correspondence, 32 TAX NOTES 1022 (Sept. 8, 1986)
(Letter from Peter L. Faber); Correspondence, 32 TAX NOTEs 1204 (Sept. 22, 1986) (Letter from
Michael L. Schler); Correspondence, 32 TAX NoTEs 1205 (1986) (Letter from Peter L. Faber). Some
of this material discusses various now moot controversial issues involved in whether mirror transactions were either valid pre-1987 or would be prospectively or retroactively invalidated by Treasury
action.
202. Section 10223(a) of Pub. L. No. 100-203 added a sentence to § 337(c) that prevented the
resort to the consolidated return regulations that is necessary for the entire transaction to work. See
infra note 203 and acompanying text.
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exchange for their stock; this gives B an outside basis of $90 in each sub.
Thus, together, SI and S2 buy all the stock of T for $180, and each of the
2 subs then owns 50 percent of T. Then, using the consolidated return
regulations,2 0° T is liquidated into S 1 and 52 with no recognition of gain
to either T under new section 337 or to S1 and S2 under section 332. At
this point S1 possesses the wanted assets of Di and 52 possesses the unwanted assets of D2 of T. Finally, B may sell the stock of S2 for $90,
which is its basis in S2, again recognizing no gain. The beauty of the
mirror transaction is that only stock is sold, no one has to deal with the
headaches of selling assets, 20 4 and yet in effect B has been able selectively
to purchase the wanted assets of T while ridding itself of the unwanted
assets of T while recognizing none of the corporate level gain involved in
doing the transaction via a section 338 election.
3. Alternatives to Mirror Transactions: The Selective Purchase and
Sale of Assets via Stock Transactions and Spin-Offs. Selectivity in the
purchase and sale of assets may be accomplished by stock transactions
other than strict mirror transactions. Though the form of those transactions may differ from the above, the possibly undesirable results may be
similar.2 °5 Take two elementary examples.
First, assume the same facts as in the hypothetical mirror transaction above. T has assets in Subs 1 and 2, and insists on selling all its
assets. Buyer wants only the assets in Sub 1. The solution is for Buyer to
purchase all the stock of T, resulting in a recognized stock appreciation
gain to T shareholders, and Buyer has $180 basis in the T shares. Both
subsidiaries are spun off by T to Buyer, its new shareholder, and Buyer
and T have no recognized gain. Buyer has a fair market value in the
stock of both Subs from its recent purchase. Buyer then sells the stock of
Sub 2 to a third party. This appears anomalous, as it might seem to violate the no purchase within five-years rule of section 355(b)(2)(D),2" 6 but
203. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-34 (1984) (for purposes of the 80% ownership test of section 332, the
stock ownership of a consolidated group can be aggregated). The interpretation of this provision is
controversial, see Kliegman, supra note 201, and in any event according to the currently effective
version of 337(c) may not be resorted to in order to enable a successful mirror transaction, see supra
note 202 and accompanying text.
204. Which is not to suggest that mirror transactions are themselves without their own headaches. These include problems with creditors of T when T is liquidated, and adverse state tax consequences when T is liquidated if, under state tax laws lacking consolidation provisions, the liquidation
ofT is taxable to S1 and S2.
205. For probable Treasury objections to this selectivity, see infra note 210.
206. See note 24 and accompanying text.
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there is no "constructive control" effect in this provision.2 °7 However,
this transaction is intended to be prevented by the new language in section 355(b)(2)(D) to the effect that a distributee corporation may not
have acquired control taxably within five years.20 8
In the second example, T has divisions D1 and D2; Buyer wants
only to acquire the assets of D1. DI is spun off to T shareholders taxfree, becoming Sub 1, and Sub 1 is acquired by Buyer. T shareholders
recognize stock appreciation gain only. If the sale by the T shareholders
to Buyer is a taxable acquisition rather than a tax-free reorganization
purchase, the device restriction must be contended with. The difficulty is
that this has always been construed as a capital gains anti-bailout provision, not as a backstop to the repeal of General Utilities. So applying the
device requirement here might be difficult, more so until its meaning is
changed by new regulations.
There are other more complex acquisitions of portions of T by
Buyer using split-offs which may avoid inside gain on asset appreciation,
so that where T wants to sell only one group of its assets and recognize
only one level of (stock appreciation) gain, split offs may be a way to sell
assets selectively without realizing any inside asset gain. Buyer may acquire less than 80 percent of T, thus not implicating the "no acquisition
of control within five years" prohibition. Following a taxable acquisition
of some T stock, Buyer may be redeemed out with a new subsidiary containing the desired portion of T's assets. Indeed, it may even be possible
to make a selective acquisition of T's assets using a split-off. For example,
buyer may be redeemed with stock of two subsidiaries, one containing
the desired assets and the other the undesired assets. The stock of the
subsidiary containing the undesired assets might possibly be quickly sold
in a prearranged transaction to a third party, since as a general rule the
prohibition regarding post-division sales under section 355 does not usually apply to split-offs.2 °9
207. See Rev. Rul. 74-5, 1974-1 C.B. 82.
208. This is itself a drafting mistake, as by negative implication it would seem to permit a distributing Buyer corporation from acquiring control of T within the five-year period and spinning off
Sub I or Sub 2 to individual shareholders tax-free. See 38 TAx NoTES 743 (Feb. 15, 1988) (Letter
from Benjamin G. Wells). It is corrected by Technical and Miscellaneous Act of 1988, H.R. No.
4333, S. 2238, § 204j)(1) which amends § 355(b)(2)(D).
209. The types of transactions briefly described in the paragraph in text are more thoroughly
explored in 38 TAX NoTEs 417 (Jan. 25, 1988) ("Avoiding the Technical Requirements of New
Section 355," Letter from Michael L. Schler).
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4. Summary. Mirror transactions in the described form are no
longer valid."' 0 Since they are not, this may put a greater emphasis on
the foresightful use of spin-offs to accomplish the selective disposition of
assets via stock sales."z ' Was this the purpose for enacting section 355?

Clearly not. It must be determined by Congress whether the use of spinoffs to sell assets selectively is an abuse, although Section D below sug-

gests why it may be undesirable."' 2 It does not appear that the device
limitation by itself, as presently conceived, would be able to police the
spin-off of assets when there is only a vague and contingent purpose some
indefinite future sale as discussed above, particularly given a three-year

statute of limitations for the shareholders. Since we have noted above
that the reasons in favor of spin-offs are perhaps less compelling in some
circumstances than often thought (in that it has been argued that the
legitimate business objectives can be attained without a spin-off of con-

trolled corporation stock to shareholders)2 13 then if this use of spin-offs
is, in addition, an abuse for the reasons discussed above and below, the

lack of affirmative reasons for spin-offs plus their abusive potential would
be an argument for repeal of tax-free spin-offs. However, sufficient valid

reasons for spin-offs remain to make this measure unwise.
210. There are three reasons for Treasury resistance to mirror transactions. First, one thought
that may occur to a lawyer is that there is an asymmetry between the treatment of the selling corporation and the treatment of the buying corporation. The buying corporation is allowed to sell the
unwanted portion of assets without recognition of gain; the selling corporation is not allowed to do
this. Why should the two corporations not be similarly treated? Perhaps the strong intuition that the
selling corporation should not be allowed to sell only a portion of its assets without current recognition of gain might suggest that the purchasing corporation ought not to be able to do this either.
Although the purchasing corporation has paid fair market value for the stock of the target, it has not
paid the toll charge on the difference between inside basis and fair market value of assets.
The second and third reasons are related to this issue of that toll charge; permitting a mirror
transaction would in effect allow an elective step-up in basis without the toll charge, and although
the purchasing corporation would eventually recognize gain when it either sold the assets formerly
belonging to the seller or liquidated, gain recognized later is not an adequate substitute for gain
currently recognized.
If the basic mirror transaction described above is no longer valid, one may well ask the purpose
for describing it in detail. There are two basic reasons. First, and partly as an historical matter, the
mirror transaction illustrates the frequency of selective efforts to purchase assets, which the text
suggests, may in the future turn into an effort to use § 355 for the same purpose. Second, there are
more sophisticated variants of the mirror transaction that have not yet been so clearly prohibited,
such as "Son of Mirror" and "Cousin of Mirror." See Sheppard, Treasury Ponders Progeny of Mirrors, 42 TAX NoTEs 915 (1989).
211. See Wolfman, supra note 200, at 671.
212. It may also be abusive because of deferral-the gain equal to the difference between the
value of D2's assets and their inside basis is recognized later by the purchaser of S2 rather than
earlier by T.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 188-94.
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C. General Utilities and Reorganizations
In the two major studies of the reform of corporate reorganizations,
it was not commented on that in a world where General Utilitieshas been
generally repealed, the one place it remains is in tax-free reorganizations
and distributions. 1 4 These studies recommend two major changes: (1)
electively of whether an acquisition of assets is tax-free to seller with a
carryover basis; and (2) separation of the corporate level effects from the
shareholder level effects.215 By and large it appears to make sense that
the seller of assets will recognize no corporate level gain if the assets have
a carryover basis to buyer,2 16 thus justifying in a limited sense retention
of General Utilities in carryover basis acquisitions.
But what about the case of spin-offs? Does it make sense to retain
General Utilities in a transaction where a corporation is being in effect
dismembered so that the integrity of assets in one corporate solution is
not preserved? This question is especially interesting when one considers
that a primary use of spin-offs post-1986 may be to sell assets selectively,
as described above, without the corporate level gain that would be mandated by a section 338 election. If the selectivity and lack of corporate
level gain in mirror transactions are determined by the Treasury to be an
abuse, that may be an argument for requiring repeal of General Utilities
in spin-offs, which can be used to the same effect as mirror transactions;
with the result that the distribution by the controlled corporation in a
spin-off would require a recognition of gain by the transferor controlling
corporation on distribution of the controlled corporation's stock to
shareholders.
D. A New Corporate Tax Principle?
Although it has been suggested that mirror transactions violate the
214. See I.R.C. § 361(c).
215. For a general overview and discussion of these proposals, see LeDuc, CurrentProposals to
Restructure the Taxation of Corporate Acquisitions and Dispositions:Substance and Process, 22 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 17 (1985).
216. As a matter of tax policy one may wonder whether this simplifying strategy is wise. Does
electivity of recognition result in too much systematic deferral? One may assume that deferral of
recognition and no step-up in basis will be frequently chosen: the tax benefit to the seller of no
current recognition of gain will always have a greater present value than the tax cost to the buyer of
no current step-up basis. Related proposals under discussion include deferred corporate recognition
of gain on stock appreciation and no step-up in basis in cash purchases of stock of a subsidiary, as
well as gain on the difference between inside basis and fair market value on a purchase of a subsidiary's stock. See A.B.A., Invitational Conference on Subchapter C, 1988 A.B.A. SEC. oF TAX'N &
N.Y.S.B.A., SEC. OF TAX'N REP.
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consistency rules of section 338,217 this does not seem to be precisely
true. These rules were intended only to prevent an acquiring corporation
from acquiring some assets with a previous low inside basis in the hands
of the seller by tax free means, for example, avoiding gain to the seller,
and acquiring other assets by purchase.2 18
That is not what is happening in mirror transactions. However,
what is happening in both spin-offs and mirror transaction may violate
an emerging corporate tax principle, namely, that "incomplete dispositions should not be tax-favored."
The support for such a proposition is inductive only, but can be seen
in such measures as the elimination of capital gains treatment for partial
liquidations; the limitation in section 338 of electively of method of acquisition to all the assets of the target corporation, and the process by
which General Utilities was gradually eliminated from section 311 by requiring larger and larger distributions for the distributing corporation
not to recognize gain.
If this is an emerging principle of corporate tax, it is easy to see how
it is offended by spin-offs and mirror transactions. As for spin-offs, the
combinations of a spin-off and a later sale allows ownership of selected
corporate assets to be placed in the hands of shareholders, and sold with
no corporate level tax, only a capital gains tax to the shareholder. According to my inductive principle, this treatment should only be available
for complete dispositions such as acquisitive reorganizations. Mirror
transactions contain a similar violation of the principle, namely, corporate assets may be sold to two different buyers without any recognition of
corporate level gain, this effect should only be available in complete dispositions such as acquisitive reorganizations.

IX.

POST ACT REFORM

-

SIMPLIFICATION, TAINT,

STAPLING, OR REPEAL

It is notable that neither the ALI nor the Senate Finance Committee
studies2 19 on Subchapter C gave any real consideration to the tax-free
status of spin-offs. The theme of this article has been that spin-offs are
not satisfactorily managed by the current section 355. It is a provision
217. See Correspondence, 32 TAX NOTES 1204-05 (Sept. 22, 1986) (Letter from Michael L.
Schler).
218. Of course, from the buyer's perspective the objectives would be reversed.
219. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, THE SUBCHAPTER C. REVISION ACT OF 1985, S.
Rpt. 99-47, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); A.L.I., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER C
PROPOSALS ON CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND DISPOSITIONS

(1982).
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that is the result of pervasive conceptual confusion, and this argues for
elimination of many of the rigorous technical requirements such as "business purpose," "five-year active business," and "no device," with the possibility of these prophylactic measures being replaced by a simpler stock
taint or stapling if capital gains 2 0 and the possibility of bail-out are ever
restored.
The elimination of capital gains and the repeal of General Utilities
change matters and complicate the picture considerably. The former reform argues for much greater freedom in spin-offs, without even a stock
taint or stapling limitation, in view of their increasing popularity. The
latter reform argues for a different result. In view of the putative lack of
necessity for spin-offs to achieve the conventional business purposes for
which they were intended, and the unconventional and perhaps dubious
use of spin-offs to sell assets selectively in the manner of mirror transactions, consideration might be given to the entire repeal of tax-free spinoffs: in other words, receipt of the spun-off stock would be taxed to the
shareholders under section 301 and its distribution by the corporation
under section 311.
If it is true that the sale by the distributee shareholders or liquidation by them of the controlled corporation's stock is the essence of what
makes a bailout a step transaction; that is, equivalent to a sale by the
controlling corporation of assets followed by a distribution of a cash dividend. Then it would seem appropriate in a post-General Utilities world
for there to be a second consequence of a sale of stock by the distributee
shareholders: that is, recognition of corporate level gain as if the distribution of controlled corporation stock were the taxable distribution of appreciated property, now ordinarily giving rise to gain for both the
distributing corporation and the recipient shareholders. It may appear
awkward to have the distributing corporation's tax liability hanging in
abeyance pending the scattered and unpredictable actions of many of its
shareholders. This is where the proposal of stapling appears not only
doctrinally attractive, but also administratively appealing. If it would be
required for a tax-free spin-off to staple the stock of the controlled corporation to that of the controlling corporation, the controlling corporation
would be guaranteed not to be required to recognize gain on any sale,
because the sale of controlled corporation stock would necessarily be
within a short time accompanied by the sale of controlling corporation
stock, which would be equivalent to a sale of shares in the controlling
220.

See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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corporation before the separation had occurred. This suggests a range of
not just two possibilities for the reform in section 355 in the post-General
Utilities world, but rather four possibilities. These would range from an
outright simplification of section 355, as suggested above, with elimination of the active business, no device, and business purpose requirements,
with no taint or stapling requirement; to the second alternative which
would be a five-year stapling requirement; to a third alternative which
would be a permanent stapling requirement; to the fourth possibility
which would be repeal of section 355 and no allowance of tax-free spinoffs.
Two other possibilities suggest themselves by analogy: (1) substituting a taint for a staple in the previous four examples, there would be the
possibility of a five-year taint; or (2) a permanent taint. This appears less
desirable, in that it would resurface the problem of the corporation's uncertain tax liability if the stock were sold within five years, coupled with
the undesirable inflexibility of the permanent taint on stock which could
never be sold without recognition of corporate gain.22 1
IX.

SUMMARY

This paper has dealt with both conceptual analysis and reform. It
details the long history during which the statutory regime governing
spin-offs has evolved. This conceptual analysis has been driven by two
fundamental theses. First, that the technical elaborateness and complexity of the various historical spin-off provisions is due primarily to what I
have referred to as conceptual indetermination. That is to say, that a
spin-off transaction and its proper statutory governance necessarily implicate a series of tax concepts which are both ambiguous and involve
difficult line-drawing. These concepts include capital gains, the permissible conversion of ordinary income into capital gains through the corporate entity of doing business, the definition of a dividend, and the
221. There are many other ways that avoiding the effects of repeals of General Utilities might be
prevented. These might include, amending the definition of "device" in the Regulations; a holding
period imposed on distributees in divisive § 355 transactions (something like the "tainting" approach
above); removing the clause in § 355(a)(1)(B) suggesting that some post-distribution sales are permissible; removing tax-free treatment for non pro rata distributions to other than historic shareholders, limiting all § 355 tax-free distributions to historic shareholders as a way of bolstering continuity

of interest requirements, or enacting a predistribution holding period for all tax-free distributions.
These and other proposals are explored in Simon & Simmons, The Future of Section 355, 40 TAx
NOTas 291 (1988). Perhaps none of them has the virtues of the stapling requirements suggested in
text, which would at once enforce both the General Utilities repeal and prevent bailouts in the likely
event of restoration of the capital gains preference.
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definition of a tax-free reorganization. All of these concepts are involved
in identifying a bailout, the prevention of which has consistently been the
goal of the spin-off legislation. Through a series of unsatisfactory attempts to handle these concepts by correctly identifying the bailout that
is to be prevented, the current section 355 has become an unnecessarily
prophylactic measure. This brings up the second point. In its concern to
prevent bailouts without satisfactory resolution of the conceptual issues
underlying a bailout, section 355 interposes a penalty by calling off taxfree treatment too soon in the series of steps that constitutes a spin-off
transaction. The determination of taxability is made upon the distribution of the spun-off stock rather than at the appropriate point, which is
the time when the bailout would be effected by realizing earnings and
profits through a sale of stock or a liquidation.
The paper proposes that the inherent difficulty of line-drawing in
this area be handled differently. The application of a five-year stapling
requirement is a somewhat arbitrary, but nevertheless easy to administer
way to prevent the evil of bailouts, which I have described as essentially
step transactions. A permanent stapling requirement would be an even
more effective measure that has not, to my knowledge, been previously
proposed. These measures would also be effective to prevent a post-Act
problem, circumvention of the General Utilities repeal.
The passage of the Act, and the study of Subchapter C by the Treasury,2 22 provide an appropriate occasion to consider both the causes of,
and possible solutions to, the important problem of preventing tax avoidance through spin-offs. It is therefore with particular interest that one
awaits the results of the study of section 355 on the agenda of the Treas223
ury study.

222. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-54 § 634; Tax Reform Act of 1986, H.R. No. 99841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
223. For a recent study of current issues involving § 355, see Section 355 Working Group, Subcomm. on Tax-Free Acquisitions, Comm. on Corp. Tax, Sec. of Tax'n, A.B.A. Report on Section 355
(July 21, 1988). This study discusses more detailed and specific practical matters compared to the
focus of this paper which is on how § 355 currently fails, and might be changed to succeed, in better
effectuating the two basic purposes of preventing both capital gain bailouts and end runs around the
General Utilities repeal. The newly issued § 355 regulations do not yet deal with issues raised by the
repeal of General Utilities.See Treas. Reg. 1.355-6 (1989).

